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This research is towards the advancement of filmosophy as a progressive new 
approach to how we think about, and through, film. This explorative research aims to 
introduce, contextualise, and expand upon the thoughts and writings of Daniel 
Frampton, as found in his 2006 manifesto: Filmosophy.  
In order to provide a suitable platform from which to introduce Frampton’s 
contemporary concepts (i.e. ‘filmind’ and ‘fluid film-thinking’), this paper first 
outlines and discusses the various ways in which philosophy and film are said to 
overlap, culminating in a critical discussion of ‘film-as-philosophy’ in terms of the 
implications it posits for providing innovative philosophical contributions through 
uniquely cinematic means (the ‘problem of paraphrase’). This literature review 
concludes by presenting and discussing filmosophy and its major tenets as both an 
appropriate extension of the current canon, and as a potentially productive new 
paradigm through which both film and philosophy can be critically considered and 
advanced.  
Due to filmosophy’s unique and relatively new inclusion as a contemporary 
approach to cinema, Chapter 2 is dedicated to presenting various criticisms aimed 
against Frampton’s ‘radical manifesto’. Similarly, Chapter 3 explores a 
methodological, ontological and epistemological framework derived from 
filmosophical inferences; orientations that specifically draw from the works of Slavoj 
Žižek’s The Parallax View (2006), Edward O. Wilson’s Consilience: the Unity of 
Knowledge (1999), and concludes by fitting filmosophical activity within Gillian 
Rose’s critical visual methodology.   
Chapter 4 is dedicated to expanding and exploring filmosophy’s key concepts, 
and then applies them in an analysis of selected scenes and features found in two 
contemporary films—Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life (2011) and Alfonso 
Cuarón’s Gravity (2013); two award-winning, curiously creative films, whose 
cinematic innovations and atypical expressions challenge the mutual exclusivity of 
film and philosophy. By offering various interpretations on selected features from 
these progressive pictures, this research argues that the ideas and worldview 
filmosophy describes are both productive and appropriate when considered through 
such neoteric, at times seemingly enigmatic, productions—in doing so attesting to the 
salient and exciting synthesis of film and philosophy. 
This work concludes by defending filmosophy as a valid and insightful mode 
of philosophical enquiry, arguing that this new approach to cine-thinking is an 
inclusive and exciting new philosophical approach that calls to further critical 
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“We must be better connoisseurs of film if we are not to be as much at the mercy of 
perhaps the greatest intellectual and spiritual influence of our age as to some blind 
and irresistible elemental force”  
- Béla Balázs (1945:17) 
 
 “If those committed to the quest fail, they will be forgiven. When lost, they will find 
another way…Let us see how high we can fly before the sun melts the wax in our 
wings”  
- Edward O. Wilson (1998:7) 
 
This dissertation is towards the advancement of filmosophy as an inclusive, enriching, 
and adaptive new approach to philosophical thinking and understanding film. What 
follows is an explorative investigation into filmosophy’s key neologisms and core 
concepts (namely the ‘filmind’ and its two constituting concepts: ‘film-world 
creation’ and ‘film-thinking’), as outlined and presented by Daniel Frampton in 
Filmosophy—“a manifesto for a radically new way of understanding cinema” 
(Frampton, 2006). 
Specifically, filmosophy’s progressive and core concept of ‘fluid film-
thinking’ is examined and then applied to two contemporary films: Terrence Malick’s 
The Tree of Life (2011) and Alfonso Cuarón’s Gravity (2013). Notable cinematic 
utterances from each film are identified and discussed and shown to benefit from the 
type of filmosophical interpretation Frampton’s manifesto posits. It is argued that 
these particular films encapsulate and contain valid and reliable examples of both 
filmosophy’s theoretical underpinnings and, specifically, stand as suitable sources of 
Frampton’s fluid film-thinking at play in modern film-going. 
This study begins by examining the current overlap of philosophy and film 
that stems from a critical review of Goodenough (2005) and Livingstone’s (2006) 
current thinkings on the philosophical nature of film-being. After which, Frampton’s 
own filmosophical approach is presented and discussed as it naturally emerges from 
the topical ‘film-as-philosophy’ debate. Filmosophy is a fledging form of cine-
thinking that has received heavy criticisms and resistance, objections and charges that 




methodological orientations around Frampton’s progressive synthesis of film and 
philosophy.   
This research aims to give filmosophy a workable methodological orientation 
by considering three contemporary approaches to ontology (through the Slavoj 
Žižek’s work in The Parallax View, 2006), epistemology (by promoting Edward O. 
Wilson’s (1998) thoughts on consilience—calling to a type of ‘vertical consilience’), 
and then seeks analytical asylum/placement within Gillian Rose’s (2012) critical 
visual methodology (in order to ground filmosophy’s progressive, arguably at times 
obscure, thinkings within contemporary methodological paradigms). By invoking the 
theories and ideas from Žižek, Wilson, Rose and other innovative thinkers, this 
research attempts to actively engage filmosophy’s progressive propositions by 
drafting a response to Frampton’s open-invitation to the future of cine-thinking.  
 
“We have entered a new era of vision”  


































SYNOPSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIMARY WORKS 
 
 
This study draws compelling case studies from Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life 
(2011) and Alfonso Cuarón’s Gravity (2013), as two contemporary, and award-
winning films, that will be shown to contain unique cinematic characteristics 
(utterances) that benefit from the type of interpretation filmosophy posits. Both films 
have been identified by the film-going community as being philosophical, technically 
innovative, poetic, and possess unique narrative structures that have challenged the 
way we currently discuss and interpret film. It will be shown that these two films are 
fitting examples of the type of progressive cinema filmosophy wishes to engage and 
explore; they are critically acclaimed, innovative, and historically significant works 
that will be used to explore Frampton’s cutting-edge thinkings on the immediate 
future of cinematic engagement.  
 
The Tree of Life 
The Cannes Film Festival is considered to be one of, if not the, most prestigious film 
award competitions held each year. This invitation-only event celebrates outstanding 
cinematic achievements and, in 2011—Žižek’s own “year of dreaming 
dangerously”—it bestowed its highest honour, the Palme d'Or (or ‘Golden Palm’), to 
Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life. This, the American auteur’s fifth feature, has 
been described as “maddeningly Delphic as its maker” (Corliss, 2011) as critics and 
viewers alike were both enchanted and befuddled by Malick’s resplendent cinematic 
dreamscape and spirited poetic presentations. Despite the film’s critical accolades and 
popularity, The Tree of Life has also been repeatedly labelled as pretentious as 
Malick’s “new hyper reverie”, in the words of the American film critic Michael 
Atkinson (2011), presents the “spectacle of a man gone deep-sea diving in his own 
navel”. Barsanti (2011) agrees, succinctly stating that Malick’s film is “possibly his 
most abstract” and is “as awe-inspiring as it is irksome”.  
The Tree of Life’s enigmatic veneer, lyrical qualia as well as its critical and 




Frampton’s poetic meditations of film-thinking. It is also a film that is rarely 
discussed outside of its own authorship (i.e. as a ‘Malick’ feature), and is largely 
described and discussed as a deeply personal feature that requires outside resources 
(e.g. knowledge/insight into Malick’s own life and philosophy pursuits46) to be fully 
illuminated or even understood. Interestingly, like Alfonso Cuarón’s Gravity (2013), 
the film has also been sited by Christian groups as some form of spiritually significant 
event: “The Tree of Life is cosmic in scope, but fragmentary, deeply inward and 
subjective, a meditation on grief in light of the possibility of the existence of God” 
(Creegan, 2012:46). However moments (such as the film’s epic, and much debated, 
‘creational sequence’) seem to run counter to such claims; and while the film does, 
quite obviously, contain specific references to Christian theology, spirituality, and 
philosophy, such descriptions fail to appropriately consider film in its entirety. Critics 
and scholars have focused on specific, seemingly ‘overt’ (e.g. the film’s opening 
biblical quote, or Malick’s own philosophy pursuits and interests), themes and 
influences that are then extrapolated beyond what is phenomenological evident—
beyond the artfulness and immediacy of the cinematic event itself.  
In The Tree of Life we are introduced to Jack O’ Brien, a middle-aged modern 
man who is deeply affected by the personal emotions the anniversary of the death of 
his brother elicits. The story takes place in Jack’s current life (as a married and 
successful architect—epitomising the modern career man in crisis), but the majority 
of the film is considered rather to be a type of lucid daydream—a personal journey 
back through Jack’s childhood that articulates key conflicts from his past that, through 
their remembering, assists Jack to find peace (his own, as Carl G. Jung might have 
observed, ‘individuation’). The film is constantly musing over the nature of life itself, 
its founding relationships, and one’s own wills against the cosmic powers that be. 
Ladders, trees, sun, water and the other prima materia are supposed over throughout 
as essentials to Jack’s dreamy return to the site of past trauma and social antagonisms.  
Operatic score and hushed narrations compliment the film’s visuals to produce 
a remarkably captivating and grandiloquent event that, quite simply, demands a new 
approach—a new language—as to how we receive and understanding such rhapsodic 
thoughtfulness. The Tree of Life was selected for this study due to its award-winning 
                                                
46	  Malick	  graduated,	  for	  example,	  summa	  cum	  laude	  and	  Phi	  Beta	  Kappa	  from	  Harvard	  University	  
in	  1965	  where	  he	  studied	  (specifically	  Kierkegaard,	  Heidegger,	  and	  Wittgenstein)	  under	  the	  




and critical acclaim, its socially noted authorial origin, enigmatic and unique narrative 
structure and splendid poetic visuals, and, in general, its contemporary existential 
concerns as it depicts the ‘modern man in peril’—features and contemporary 




Alfonso Cuarón’s space thriller Gravity follows the medical engineer Dr Ryan Stone 
on her first space mission aboard fictitious Shuttle Explorer's STS-157. A small team, 
most notable of which is the veteran astronaut Matt Kowalski, accompanies her, but 
their mission is soon devastated when a Russian missile destroys a defunct satellite 
that causes a chain reaction of destructive debris. This leaves Dr Stone and Kowalski 
floating in space, disconnected from the Earth and with little chance of survival. The 
film follows the two as they struggle to make their way to other space stations in the 
hope that they will be able to make their way back to Earth by using one of their 
space capsules.  
 Gravity was praised by commercial filmmaker James Cameron as “the best space 
film ever done” (quoted in Hill, 2013), and has already been flagged as a promising 
contender for the 2014 Academy Awards in multiple categories—specifically for its 
ground-breaking and innovative visual effects, cinematography, and Cuarón’s own 
directing (which won him the Best Director award at the 2014 Golden Globes and at 
the Director’s Guild of America awards). The film has already been honoured at the 
2013 Venice Film Festival, were it won the Future Film Digital Award and since 
grossed over six-hundred-and-seventy million dollars worldwide47. The film boasts 
top Hollywood talents (in the form of its lead actress Sandra Bullock and co-star 
George Clooney), award-winning and innovative special effects, and has managed to 
amass more than six times its production costs. However Gravity, like The Tree of 
Life, has remained somewhat of a mystery, and its barebones structure and innovative 
camerabatics and worldview invites philosophical contemplation and interpretation 
beyond what critics and theorist are currently able to fully articulate or express. Such 
new technologies require a new way of thinking about their effects, not merely 
‘demystifying’ their behind-the-scenes workings—beyond artfulness and aesthetics. 
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  according	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Kristin Thompson (2013), in her lengthy dissection of the film, stated that: 
“[I]t is hard to think of another mass-audience film in recent years that has so 
thoroughly departed from the current technological and stylistic conventions of 
mainstream filmmaking”, calling it an “experimental blockbuster” that contains 
“unconventional aspects” (Thompson, 2013). Hoberman (2013) agrees, saying that 
Gravity is “[g]enuinely experimental” and is “blatantly predicated on the formal 
possibilities of film”. The film’s various unconventional and experimental facets have 
led many critics to label Gravity, as Richard Corliss (2013) did, as the “glorious 
future of cinema” that showcases “groundbreaking technical ingenuity”—an 
achievement that has subsequently earned the film, in addition to nine other 
categories, an Oscar nomination for Best Visual Effects and Best Cinematography. 
The film’s “vertiginous” imaginings, in the words of Rolling Stone’s Logan Hill 
(2013), warrants the film’s selection in this research as Frampton’s filmosophy calls 
directly to such neoteric and progressive cinematic events. 
The film’s unprecedented technical wizardry produced pictures that exposed 
the limits of our current, more technical, cine-vocabulary, and the commentaries thus 
far have failed to submit any meaningful elucidation (beyond the artful objectification 
of the image and ‘real world’ causal conditions) on the nature and consequences of 
these original works as experienced.   
While many film writers have consistently commented on the film’s 
experimental qualities—Variety’s Scott Foundas (2013) avant-garde—few 
journalists/critics have attempted to, or convincingly, described the actual emotive 
effect/philosophical significance of these creative cinematic utterances. Surprisingly, 
the overwhelming tendency was to, instead, demystify the new technology (rather 
than describe the drama effect these new ‘thoughts’ produce) by ‘revealing’ the 
behind-the-scenes workings of Cuarón’s camerabatics, or to debate how accurate it 
was to real life by crude and unfitting comparisons.  Mike Seymour (2013), for 
example, produces an impressively detailed and exhausting account of the film’s 
technological construction for fxguide that reportedly blows Gravity’s back door48 off 
its new-age hinges. Other articles seek ‘extra-textual49’ comfort in the form of probing 
                                                
48 Frampton writes that “[w]here technicist writing opens a back-door to the film, conceptual-ising the 
film as thinking opens the front-door” (Frampton, 2006:175). 
49	  ‘Extra-textual’ is term coined here to describe all indirect and invasive forces that may inhibit access 
to a film’s experiential qualities and its unique philosophical potential; to information that exists 




the film’s ‘all-knowing’ director who is able to comfortingly  “Answer All Your 
Questions” (Lee, 2013); Christian critics have, once again, gone one holier, claiming 
that Gravity clearly “celebrates the presence of God in the universe” (Child, 2013); 
while others theorist and writers seem content to persist in exclusive narrative 
deconstructions—all of which orbit the film’s poetic particularities, but also managed 
to circumnavigate, and avoid articulating, the consequences of those sublime scenes 
on thought itself.  
Frampton reminds us that descriptions “should not wound the film, should not 
cut the film’s surface to reveal its technological workings, but should open-up the 
image to reveal its thinkings, its belief about the people and objects it has gained50” 
(Frampton, 2006:175). Critics and writers who are able to acknowledge Gravity’s 
awe-inspiring sound-images, but who remain steadfast in retardant readings of such 
unique enunciations, risk associating the innovation on display as simply a social 
success, rather than pillars to a possible future: an, obviously popular, sign of 
thoughts to come. Instead of dutiful deconstructions, which Frampton lobbies against, 
we should, instead, “attempt to reflect the film in power and passion – listening to a 
film’s thinkings, and pointing to the power that it has” (Frampton, 2006:181).  
This research values those specific moments and philosophical ideas in both 
films that have caused them the identified as acclaimed and curious features, and will 
seek to identify those distinct and progressive cinematic utterances for the purpose of 
exploring them as emergent and ‘fluid film-thoughts’. These films are explored and 
considered through filmosophy’s mandate towards an “organic philosophy of film”, 
one that “allows the filmgoer to experience the film as a drama issuing from itself, 
rather than taking them further outside the experience to the actions of authors, 
directors or invisible narrators” (Frampton, 2006:7). Therefore, while Gravity and The 
Tree of Life have been identified as socially, technically, and artistically significant 
and innovative, what this research prompts are interpretations and understandings of 
the films themselves by philosophical considering them as ‘cinematic experiences’—
as film lives lived, felt, and thought of/through rather than over-valuing secondary 
                                                                                                                                      
detracts from the pure audio-visual utterances of the artwork in question (e.g. the actual technology 
used, authorial influences, actor acknowledgements, etc.).	  
50	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  frequently	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  instances	  




sources and fuelling fantasies of authorship and deconstruction that, filmosophy 









































Philosophy of Film and Filmosophy 
 
 
Philosopher Jerry Goodenough (2005:1) notes four excuses a “philosopher qua 
philosopher” might employ to explain their trips to the cinema. First, the film-thinker 
might wilfully engage with the “Cinematic Experience”—an umbrella term used to 
bracket the social, technological, and phenomenological processes and aspects 
involved in film-going (Goodenough, 2005:1-2).  The intellectually curious mind 
would invest their attention towards the ‘film phenomena’—as the nexus between 
sociological and technological film features—as well as attempt to understand the 
perceptual and cognitive activities at play both during and after the event. 
Goodenough (2005:1-2) elicits Plato’s classic ‘cave’ thought experiment to illustrate 
how philosophy and film might intersect; suggesting that philosophers may seek the 
analogy between “the masses [filmgoers] immersed in the darkness [theatre]” and the 
“chained inhabitants of Plato’s cave”, or attempt to problematise the “whole concept 
of motion pictures” (cinema’s very constituting characteristics)—as seen by, for 
example, with Derek Jarman’s homochromatic Blue (1993). 
Goodenough’s proposed first order of philosophical film-being is broad and 
inclusive, and functions as an ‘outside-in’ mode of inquiry. However Rybin (2009:45), 
in his summation of Goodenough’s approach, adds that “ontology” has always been a 
pivotal consideration of the philosophically-minded filmgoer, and that Goodenough 
does not go far enough in distinguishing theories of cinematic being (derived from the 
experience) from the accompanying epistemological paradigms. Rybin subsequently 
splits Goodenough’s first order into two logical tensions found within the “Cinematic 
Experience”, including both critical paradigmatic epistemologies (the ‘sociology’ 
axiom) and the medium’s unorthodox problematising of ‘film-being’. Rybin (2009:47) 
suggests that this ontological node “grows naturally” from Goodenough’s opening 




the epistemological and ontological axis of philosophical film being (i.e. to represent 
both film’s unique mode of being and its critical reception within a given sociological 
space). 
Goodenough’s second and third reasons for why a philosopher might explore 
cinema depends on a given feature’s appropriateness for philosophical interpretation 
(its ‘goodness of fit’); prompting essential questions regarding being and 
consciousness through either explicit (as subject matter) or implicit (as theme or 
subtext) means. Films, according to Goodenough (2005:2-3), have the capacity to 
contain implicit philosophical cues that “may illustrate philosophical themes or issues” 
[e.g. The Matrix (1999), Avatar (2009), Blade Runner (1982)] or make their 
philosophical interests explicitly known by incorporating philosophical themes “into 
the action” and discussing them openly [e.g. Waking Life (2001), Wittgenstein (1993), 
The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology (2013), Is the Man Who Is Tall Happy? (2013)].  
Implicit content in films are often cited by philosopher to illustrate a particular 
philosophical issue or question; they aim to help teach core principles to students by 
exposing them to the notion that films come to us with a priori knowledge that is 
‘accessed’ through a sort of philosophical archaeology. Many theorists have, for 
example, demonstrate that The Matrix illustrates various philosophical concepts such 
as Jean Baudrillard's “Simulacra and Simulation”, Descartes’s “Evil Demon”, and 
other philosophical inquisitions into the realms of metaphysics, ethics, freewill, 
existentialism, and so on51. 
Extracting information from films for philosophical dissection is common 
practice and is increasingly becoming part of the discourse for contemporary 
cinematic consumption. The Matrix (1999) is a particularly popular and obvious 
choice for modern philosophers and cinephiles52, and the film’s success and cinematic 
importance has resulted in it being regarded as contemporary “cultural currency” 
(Goodenough, 2005:2). Given the film’s prevalence and commercial success 
philosophers have been able to faithfully call upon film’s unique audio-visual 
utterances (e.g. the film’s innovative use of technology to create, what has come to be 
called, ‘bullet time’) to explore philosophical perspectives on the nature of our world 
and its sensations (the ‘simulated reality’ hypothesis, for example, and the ‘brain in a 
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  See,	  for	  example,	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  and	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  of	  the	  Real	  (Irwin,	  2002).	  
52	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  and	  enthusiastic	  




vat’ thought experiment). Seen in this manner—and given the importance of visual 
media in modern society, as arguably the “greatest intellectual and spiritual influence 
of our age” (Balázs, 1945:17)—films act as approachable points of access that provide 
contemporary thinkers with, what Wittgenstein might call, an ‘adequate diet of 
examples’ from which to launch philosophical discussions and debate.  
Films that can be consider implicit in their philosophical orientation, those that 
take the topic in a “serious or central way" (Goodenough, 2005:2), are far less 
common. These films deal with philosophical content openly and are explicit in their 
aims and course, they unambiguously present an experience that consciously attends 
to whatever philosophical assertion is being described or argued. Derek Jarman’s 
avant-garde drama Blue (1993), for example, unequivocally posits that the filmgoer 
contemplate the socio-political context of Jarman’s hardships through memory—as a 
type of philosophical ‘shock tactic’, a type of aesthetic anarchy, that explicitly endows 
its cinematic utterances with meditations on an ostracised being-in-a-world. Blue is an 
extreme case that is perilously positioned on the cusp of cinema’s event horizon; it 
contains a jarring homochromatic blue abyss that dreamily transfigures filmic reality 
almost beyond what can be recognised as ‘film’ (as containing both substantial audio 
and visual components). But other examples exist that are less revolutionary. Michel 
Gondry’s conversations with Noam Chomsky in the animated documentary Is the Man 
Who Is Tall Happy? (2013) and Slavoj Žižek’s thoughts in The Pervert's Guide to 
Ideology (2012), for example, are both explicitly philosophical and naturally less 
threatening in terms of the pressure they place on the medium’s primary mode of 
cinematic identification.  
Goodenough’s final category argues that film can function “as philosophy” 
itself, and is somehow “doing philosophy” (Goodenough, 2005:3); films can operate 
on a level that “functions as something more than an index of already articulated 
philosophical concerns” (Rybin, 2009:47). The cinematic experience is an active event 
that problematises, questions, and advances philosophical thought through means 
exclusive to the medium: “philosophy accompanies both the post-filmic reflection 
upon film experience [as expressed by three approaches already discussed] but is also 
involved with the actual viewing of the film” (Rybin, 2009:68).  
This final category is the ‘hard problem’ facing film-philosophy, and one that 




radical neo-mindings on this important ‘film-as-philosophy’ discussion, it is necessary 
to further critique and explore the correlation to include a more nuanced cartography 
of the borderlands between philosophy—as meaningful intellectual activity—and the 
cinematic event as experienced. 
 
The Bold Thesis 
Thus this research moves towards, what Paisley Livingston describes as, the 
“bold thesis”; the argument that before film can be said to be doing philosophy, its 
philosophical output (i.e. the knowledge or insight it would potentially yield—its 
‘philosophical significance’) should be evaluated in terms of whether or not those 
emergent propositions came exclusively from cinematic means53 (Livingston, 
2006:11).  
Livingston does, through his argument, ultimately support to a more modest 
stance between the relationship between philosophy and film, observing that:  
Films can provide vivid and emotionally engaging illustrations of 
philosophical issues, and when sufficient background knowledge is in 
place, reflections about films can contribute to the exploration of 
specific theses and arguments, sometimes yielding enhanced 
philosophical understanding.  
 
Smuts (2009:409) concurs, saying “some films can make innovative, 
independent philosophical contributions by cinematic means”. Smuts succinctly 
paraphrases Livingston’s argument and then proceeds to evaluate the thesis regarding 
its ‘artistic’ and ‘epistemological’ criterion. The former addresses the “exclusive 
capacity of the cinematic medium54” (Livingston, 2006:11), while a film’s ability to 
create new knowledge (epistemology) involves assessing to what degree it produce 
“innovative” and “independent” contributions to the field of philosophy (Smuts, 
2009:411).  
It is along these axes (epistemological and ontological) that both Smuts and 
Livingston argue that the validity of film as philosophy must be appropriately 
                                                
53 ‘Exclusive cinematic means’ addresses “the cinematic medium's exclusive capacities 
involves the possibility of providing an internally articulated, non-linguistic, visual 
expression of content…Only the cinema can provide moving images of past events, and such 
images can be informative in ways other representations cannot” (Livingston, 2006:12). 
54 Smuts (2009:410) does note that “exclusive to cinema” is ambiguous, and may refer to 
claims regarding the “putative philosophical contributions or merely about the means” and 
that this distinction “requires careful elaboration, since it marks the distinction between a 




considered. Livingston’s ‘bold thesis’ is a medium-specific argument that remains 
largely sceptical of film’s capacity to develop unique philosophical insight—a stance 
that Smuts attempts to defuse by arguing that film can make philosophical 
contributions through “paradigmatic cinematic means” rather than questioning if “film 
as a medium has some unique abilities, unavailable to other media, whereby it can do 
philosophy” (Smuts, 2009:410). 
Like Goodenough, Smuts is largely interesting in, broadly speaking, “narrative 
artworks” (Smuts, 2009:410), and does not attempt to examine how cinema might 
possess unique characteristics that can be said to be doing philosophical work. While 
deviating somewhat from Livingston’s original claims, Smuts argues that, in the 
strictest sense, the “unique philosophical abilities of the cinematic art form” would 
constitute a type of “super bold thesis”; that holds that “films are able to make 
philosophical contributions that cannot be roughly approximated in other media” 
(Smuts, 2009:410). Smuts’ “super bold thesis” is assumed under Frampton’s 
neologisms of the filmind and fluid film-thinking, but what is important to note here is 
that both Goodenough and Smuts recognise how problematic, perhaps largely 
unnecessary, it is to attempt to reduce the ‘reliability’ of philosophical enquiry to 
specific linguistic qualifiers and cognitive mode of contemplation.  
Less contention can be found along Smuts’ “epistemological criterion”, the 
axis of cinematic experience that seeks qualification of philosophical output against its 
innovative thinkings, as well as the degree to which those thoughts are independent of 
some “interpretation or imported, pre-existing philosophical context” (Smuts, 
2009:411). The first tenet, innovation, simply states that philosophical output of a 
given investigation  helps “distinguish between the mere illustration of a pre-existing 
philosophical concept and the presentation of a new idea”—a point that the American 
philosopher Noël Carroll agrees with as we attempt to evaluate the extent to which a 
film is able to contribute towards philosophy (Smuts, 2009:411). Smuts reminds us 
that few, uniquely philosophical, claims would be able to defend against the 
innovation criterion, and that the bold thesis should, thus, not set a “minimal standard” 
of philosophising and be viewed rather as “a claim about the philosophical potential of 




Innovation is closely tied to Livingston’s second consideration, that of 
independence, in that a film can “provide a historically innovative55 contribution to 
knowledge regarding some philosophical topic, doing so in a significantly independent 
or autonomous manner” and “would not be dependent on a subsequent paraphrase” 
(Livingston, 2006:11). However Smuts (2009:411) indicates that “[a]ll philosophical 
work that the cinematic dramatization could perform would be dependent on the un-
cinematic, linguistic elements” and reformulates this epistemological criterion to 
attend to paradigmatic cinematic means (e.g. montage, editing, framing, etc.).  
One such area might include new cinematic technologies, advances in 
production technologies (e.g. Gravity’s ‘lightbox’ and ‘Iris’56) and reception (The X’s 
multi-screen ‘ScreenX’57). These types of “medium-specific” innovations advance the 
cinema’s “ability to produce paradigms powerful enough to conceptualize the 
technological present and future” (Gaines, 2013:77). We should, therefore, take 
caution when considering Livingston’s ‘independent means’ in the strictest sense, or 
risk a reductionism that encourages theoretical sterility by confining philosophical 
contributions to ‘within’ the cinematic event. 
The Problem of Paraphrase 
In What happened to the Philosophy of Film History? (2013) Gaines claims 
that “[t]he question as to whether there once was, never was, always has been, or can 
be a philosophy of film history depends on what we now want to see as having 
happened or not having happened in our field”. This approach to “media-specific” 
histories is considered under Frampton’s filmosophical approach, and concurs with 
Don Crafton’s claim that “there is no boundary between history and theory” (Gaines, 
2013:71). Gaines’s comments on the philosophy of film history addresses what 
Livingston calls the two ‘horns of dilemma’—the “insoluble problem of paraphrase” 
(Livingston, 2006:12).  
                                                
55 “An achievement is historically innovative only if it is new relative to the history of the relevant 
tradition” (Livingston, 2006:11). 
56 To create the innovative and fluid camera movements found in Alfonso Cuarón Gravity, a special 
“lightbox” was constructed which contained “a large array of LEDs—essentially like an inward facing 
screens of giant television screens” while the actors were shot by a unique robotic camera rig called 
“Iris” (Seymour, 2013). 
57 “ScreenX” is a new technology that was showcased at the 18th Busan International Film Festival 
through Kim Ji-woon’s short action film The X. It incorporates three screens to produce a uniquely 




Simply put, the problem of paraphrase58 logically arises when the criteria (i.e. 
artistic and epistemological) of the bold thesis are met, and thus brings into question 
both the reliability and validity of the philosophical contribution being claimed. In 
other words, if we submit to the hypothesis that film can do philosophy (i.e. make 
philosophical contributions through exclusive cinematic means) then the resultant 
philosophical knowledge should be able to be stated (Smuts, 2009:411). If we are 
unable to articulate a film’s philosophical insight, then the validity of the bold thesis 
comes critically into question (i.e. that film can actually do philosophy) and, 
conversely, if that insight can in fact be stated, further reasons are then required in 
order to fortify the reliability of those statements to determine whether the knowledge 
is exclusively dependant on the medium’s linguistic parameters (Smuts, 2009:411).  
Both Smuts and Livingston are cognisant of the challenges of paraphrase 
imposes, and attempt to re-address different aspects of their bold thesis in order to 
prevent cinema’s potential to philosophise from being trivialised, dismantled or 
dismissed entirely. Livingston (2006:15) ultimately59 endorses “giving up on both the 
exclusivity and strong epistemic constraints”, arguing that: 
[I]t is more plausible to recognize film's remarkable capacity to quote, 
re-present, or "nest" a wide range of other media and expressive 
devices, including verbal discourse, pictures, bodily gestures, 
theatrical decors, the expressivity of the human face, music, various 
cultures' communicative codes or symbol systems, and so on. 
 
In attempting to soften some of theoretical rigidity that comes directly, and logically, 
attached to the bold thesis, Livingston moves to reinstate cinema’s intrinsic and artistic 
capacity for influence (as the ‘nest’ in which multiple language signifies inhabit to 
produce and convey philosophical meaning), and affirms the agency and responsibility 
on the philosophical expositor:  
The burden of proof rests on the shoulders of anyone who comes to 
suspect that there exists a new and controversial source of 
philosophical knowledge…[A] philosophically-oriented interpreter of 
a film must take up the task of importing a well-defined 
‘problematique’ if aspects of the film's thematic and narrative design 
                                                
58 Livingston (2006:13) notes his use of the term ‘paraphrase’ as “the result of an attempt to provide an 
interpretative statement or thinking through of that item's meanings. To convey an interpretation of 
some item's philosophically relevant meanings one must employ linguistically mediated philosophical 
back-ground assumptions and arguments”.  
59 Livingston’s two other rejected lines of thought were: “(1) giving up on exclusivity while 
maintaining strong epistemic requirements” and  “(2) maintaining exclusivity while giving up on 




are to resonate with sufficiently sophisticated and well-articulated 
theses or arguments (Livingston, 2006:13,15). 
 
Smuts, however, is more concerned with redefining the claim of innovation; the bold 
thesis’ condition that a film must produce a “new idea or argument” and the 
constriction it places on what constitutes “philosophical knowledge” (Smuts, 
2009:412). Here a philosophical contribution is rearticulated to include “innovative 
reasoning” rather than “merely counting a ‘new idea’ or argument” (Smuts, 2009:412). 
Smuts (2009:412) substitutes “argument” for “reasons to believe”, a semantic 
seclusion that, Smuts claims, diffuses the problem of paraphrase by accepting the 
medium’s communicative parameters (as existing within certain medium-specific 
linguistic qualifiers), and by examining what it is exactly philosophers do and how.  
Thought experiments are one such mental tool philosophers (as well scientists 
and filmmakers) summon when critically considering a particular phenomenon or 
idea, and act as essential simulations of the variables and ideas being questioned. 
They are the intellectual and creative tools used as either “intuition pumps” or, by 
enacting appropriate analogies60, a tool recently employed by Nathan Andersen in 
Shadow Philosophy: Plato's Cave and Cinema (2014) that states that “to take film 
seriously is also to engage with the fundamental question of philosophy”. By re-
examining the bold thesis in this manner (as a type of ‘metaphilosophy’), Smuts 
argues for a more liberal approach that largely avoids the issue of paraphrase by 
acknowledging the medium’s specific nature and being, including the intellectual 
tools and trademarks used by philosopher’s themselves. 
Filmosophy 
In the previous section Goodenough (through Rybin) and Livingston’s 
(supported by Smuts) approaches to film as philosophy were reviewed in order to 
establish a theoretical territory, as a brief overview of two contemporary meditations 
on the overlap between philosophy and cinema. It was shown that there are at least 
four ways a philosopher might engage or immerse themselves in the “Cinematic 
Experience”, leading to a final mode (film as philosophy) that was then linked to a 
discussion on Livingston’s ‘bold thesis’. Both approaches engage the seemingly 
natural ‘mixing’ of cinema and philosophy, and argue that it is indeed possible and 
                                                
60 “A standard analogical argument suggests that because two things are alike in some ways they are 




enriching to critically question philosophy’s attraction to the screen and the medium’s 
intrinsic lobbying for philosophical constitution. 
The following section moves towards, what Daniel Frampton (2006:183) 
introduces as, ‘filmosophy’: the study of “film as thinking”. Filmosophy is interested 
in “the philosophical question of how film creates the meaning filmgoers feel, beyond 
mechanics and creative intention”; the filmgoer begins with the authentic “sound-
image experience” to reveal the “pure poetry of cinema” before the encounter is 
“mangled by contextual knowledge” (Frampton, 2006:75). Filmosophy argues that 
films “can philosophize, and can do so with their own means of expression which 
extend beyond philosophy as a linguistic activity” (Schmerheim, 2008:111); thus, 
filmosophy can be said to be a natural extension of both Goodenough’s final mode of 
philosophical film being, Livingston’s ‘bold thesis’, and Smuts’ super bold thesis as 
Frampton (2006:213) does claim, rather radically at the end of his manifesto, film to 
be “the beginning and the future of our thought”.  
Central to Frampton’s thesis is the ‘filmind’, a neologism that provides a 
“conceptual understanding of the origin of film’s actions and event“ that “wishes to 
place the origin of film-thinking ‘in’ the film itself" (Frampton, 2006:73). When 
considered under Livingston’s bold thesis, filmosophy declares that film inherently 
engages in ‘doing’ or ‘thinking’ about philosophy; that film’s unique and formal 
constitutions are able to generate innovative philosophical insights that are 
independently realised. Whereas Smuts and Livingston discuss and problematise a 
‘soft’ or modest bold thesis, Frampton’s approach stresses the “unique philosophical 
abilities of the cinematic art form” (Smuts, 2009:410) and that “at the ‘end’ of 
philosophy lies film” (Frampton, 2006:183). Contemporary philosophers such as 
Noam Chomsky (Is the Man Who Is Tall Happy?) and Slavoj Žižek (The Pervert's 
Guide to Cinema) have also shared and presented their thinkings via audio-visual 
means; while modern filmmakers (e.g. Terrence Malick, Alfonso Cuarón, Béla Tarr, 
Derek Jarman) continue to explore the medium’s unique means—its poetic and 
innovative production potential—to affect philosophical contemplations: 
In the last century it might be said that philosophy became filmic and 
film became philosophical…Filmosophy is the study of film as 
thinking, and thus extends into the study of ‘philosophical’ film-






Filmosophy’s filmind is “another kind of mind, its own mind, a new mind” 
(Frampton, 2006: 73), one that has been ‘designed’ with the present cinematic climate 
and future in mind. According to Frampton (2006:76), film’s new organ contains two 
aspects, or, constituting dimensions to consider: “the film-being that creates the basic 
film-world of recognisable people and objects” (film-world creation) and “the film-
being that designs and refigures this film-world” (film-thinking). These two 
hemispheres will be presented and discussed to work towards Frampton’s ambitious 
and progressive submission of ‘fluid film-thinking’—those ‘state-of-the-art’ 




Filmosophy is the study of film as thinking, however before we can begin to 
discuss what kinds of thinking film can be said to be doing, it is necessary to 
theoretically account for the worlds (or ‘spaces’) that informs film-being. Frampton 
(2006:77) states the filmind “creates everything we see and hear in a film”, it is 
responsible for the audio-visual sensations and cues that we acknowledge as forming 
part of the film-going experience. These auditory and visual phenomena coalesce and 
constitute a kind of ‘filmind’s eye’, conscious cues that bring about a clockwork 
universe of dramatic and intellectual interest. 
In Towards A Theory of Film Worlds (2008) film theorist Daniel Yacavone 
claims film worlds are “complex object-experiences with both symbolic/cognitive and 
affective dimensions” (2008:83) and that such spaces are “immersive and 
transformational” by nature (2008:105). These complex cinematic worlds are unique, 
incommensurable, and organic as the filmgoer’s essential ‘being-in-a-world’ is 
steered by the spatial and temporal arrangement of filmic elements. Similarly, cinema, 
according to Plate (2008:5), forms part of the “symbol-creating apparatus of culture, 
yet it can also aspire to more, to world-encompassing visions of the nomos and 
cosmos”. To Plate, arguing towards a critical religious film theory, film brings new 
worlds into existence, and that the act of ‘worldmaking’ harnesses the “spaces and 
times that are available in the psychical world” (Plate, 2008:6).  
These new worlds, once created/presented, are not static stills of a lifeless 




through rebuilding, reconstruction, recombining” (Plate, 2008:8). This constant ‘re-
creation’ is what Frampton (2006:80) describes when he suggests that the filmind 
“simultaneously creates and refigures the film-world"; Frampton (2006:82) takes 
Plate’s descriptors further by attributing this continual reconstitution to film-thinking: 
[T]he filmind creates a world which it then re-thinks (or sometimes 
fluidly re-recreates), that the film-world contains ostensible objects for 
the filmgoer, and that film-thinking is enacted through the filmind's 
intention towards those objects. 
 
Yacavone (2008:83) contends that a theory of film-worlds must “address both their 
creation and objective existence and their subjective experience by viewers” beyond 
its “its represented content or setting, or whatever formal and thematic aspects”. To 
this filmosophy views the film-world as being constituted through the filmind’s 
thinkings, and not simply the cinematic ‘space’ in which characters and objects exists: 
“Thinking is the ground of the world of film, and the ground of the life of 
filmosophy” (Frampton, 2006:193). Plate and Frampton emphasis the creational (and 
re-creational) potential of film-worlds61, and in filmosophy world-making arrives at 
our senses through film-thinking (Frampton, 2006:80). A photograph is not able to 
‘re-think’ its worldview, the angle, colour, characters, objects, lighting, etc. are frozen 
in a time and space. Film, on the other hand, is constantly re-thinking its world 
through spatial/temporal movements: it may show a new angle on a scene, bring 
characters in and out of the frame, jump to a new perspective instantly, emphasis 
action with sounds or silence, and so on. Frampton (2006:80), however, notes that the 
“concept of film-world creation is simply there as a background idea, available for 
when fluid film-thinking films arrive at our senses”. Film-world creation describes the 
conditions of film-being, and not necessarily the evolution or arrangement of those 
conditions for effect.  
 
Basic Film-thinking 
Having arrived in some version of space-time (through film-world creation), 
filmosophy puts forth three intermingling modes of film-thinking that correspond to a 
film’s ‘mindfulness’—its conscious regard of characters and events. These three 
categories (basic, formal, and fluid) are, to varying degrees, active processes of the 
                                                
61 “The filmind and the film-world may be strictly one and the same thing, but film-thinking is (most 





filmind that never stop thinking, never stops being, and “thinks with its beginning and 
end ‘in mind’” (Frampton, 2006:84). Basic film-thinking is the “unique base design to 
the structure and appearance of the film-world” as ”composing, ordering, 'choosing' 
images and sounds” (Frampton, 2006:82-83). Here, rudimentary elements (e.g. 
aspect-ratio, colour, selection) of film-being are isolated to account for the filmind’s 
ability to stabilise its creations within the most fundamental conditions of cinematic 
existence.  
This level of cinematic cognition, like film-world creation, describes the 
essential nature of the image and its arrangement. It is the “coherent design of the 
base film-world”, the “default attitude the filmind has about its world and characters” 
(Frampton, 2006: 82). It is not the order per se, but the act of ordering, not the type of 
shot, but the shot’s existence itself that basic film-thinking describes: the unobtrusive 
“composing, ordering, 'choosing' images and sounds” that creatively structures the 
event through “almost neutral decision-making” (Frampton, 2006:83).  
When considered under the bold thesis’ ‘exclusive’ conditions, basic film-
thinking is the primary point of departure from which cinema can be said to possess 
medium-specific traits. It is our entry into critically considering the creator’s presence 
in the pictures and the conscious baseline from which more formal (potentially fluid) 
utterances arise. Basic film-thinking structures and creates a “united space-time film-
world that is really very dissimilar to the real world” (Frampton, 2006:83); but since 
the film-world is dynamic and malleable, basic film-thinking is seen as simply the 
raw and unrefined presentational dimensions of a constantly shifting and morphing 
film-world. The canvased ‘worldview’ basic film-thinking describes arrives at our 
cinematic senses through formal and fluid film-thinking, and is so retrospectively 
considered, or else remains quintessentially surreal. 
 
Formal Film-thinking 
Frampton’s formal film-thinking, the second level, is best understood as an 
extension to more classic schools of stylistic analysis, specifically discussions around 
film form and mise en scène62. Frampton associates this type of thinking to traditional 
                                                
62	  Gibbs (2002:5), in his discussion of visual style, defines ‘mise en scène’ as “the contents of the 
frame and the way that they are organised” and it “encompasses both what the audience can see, and 
the way in which we are invited to see it”. Here Gibbs is addresses the aesthetic, or pictorial, value and 




elements in formal film production (lighting, camera angles and framing, actors and 
objects, colour, sound, cinematography, and so on); as that which “’surrounds’ 
recognisable people and objects”. Frampton does present six basic “fields of film 
composition” (image, colour, sound, frame, movement and edit-shifts—essentially 
adjuncts to mise en scène) that are used to show how “general film form is thinking”; 
from here though, Frampton’s more progressive thesis of fluid film-thinking emerges 
as a fascinating re-creational force, one that dramatically “tears and rips into it [the 
film-world], morphing it from within" (2006:116, 88).  
Formal film-thinking differs from, although is intrinsically tied to, fluid film-
thinking. The former is the process by which the film-world is constantly re-created 
(from the outside in as it ‘surrounds’ visual elements); whereas with the fluid change 
emerges from within to dramatically transfigure those formal elements in service of, 
potentially, more “poetic and transcendent functions” (Frampton, 2006:90).  
 
Fluid Film-thinking 
Fluid film-thinking represents filmosophy’s ‘highest’ level of conceptualised 
cognition, a dynamic thoughtfulness that “alters the basic film-world from the inside 
out”; this, according to Frampton (2006:88), is “re-creative film-thinking”.  
Fluid film-thinking arrives at our senses when the images and sounds 
(Frampton’s ‘sound-images’) ‘shift’, or re-imagine, the film’s own and immediate 
regard. Moment to moment the filmgoer may not be fully aware that the filmind has 
thought a fork in the narrative road (overlooked, perhaps, by falsely attributing the 
causal conditions of cinematic progression to ‘intertextuals’, whereby character 
conflict and drama are considered the ‘active agents’), for example. And if perceived, 
that change may then result in a type of cognitive dissonance in the filmgoer, one that 
strains the suspension of disbelief for effective entertainment. This type of film-
thinking is adaptive, sometimes reticent, and describes the synthesis of the film’s 
formal arrangement and its perpetual potential.   
There is a moment in Gravity, to briefly illustrate, when mission specialist Dr 
Ryan Stone is drifting helplessly away from the filmgoer; the camera no longer 
follows her closely and remains ‘stationary’ in a point in space. Formal film-thinking 
would have the filmgoer expect the camera to move back towards her through space, 




the film’s regard. Instead, Dr Stone’s estranged body slows down and then, 
unexpectedly, steadily starts to move/spin back towards the camera. Such 
unpredictable and surreal distortions are, filmosophically considered, revolutionary 
re-creations of the film-world; they are serendipitous shifts of a shared consciousness, 
recognisable only through dialectic consideration of cinema’s own essential 
possibilities and the filmgoer’s engagement.    
 Such surreal distortions would not have been ‘formally’ possible when 
considered under more traditional modes of film formalism. Dr Stone was moving 
away along the z-axis, and then— absent an explicit explanation and any pictorial 
force intervening—moves back ‘towards’ the camera. The film’s spatial thinkings 
here are morph, distorted in such a way as to ‘re-create’, or re-think, the normative 
cinematic principles of coherence and form. In this example, Dr Stone’s motion 
seemingly defies Newton’s laws, an ironic occurrence given the film’s ‘scientified’ 
film-world and view. However this is not a creative error, nor is it an attempt to 
confuse the filmgoer into entertaining some form cognitive dissonance. Instead, 
filmosophy suggests the filmind is fluidly re-thinking Dr Stone’s condition by 
transfiguring its ‘worldview’. Such filmic utterances only make sense when we 
employ the type of filmosophising that Frampton posits, when we realise that the film 
is thinking something new via new technologies and techniques, changing and 
adapting to contemporary creativity and the medium’s celebrated capacity for 
innovative thought.  
Filmosophy’s conceptualisation of fluid thought will be explored in detail in 
the coming sections, and the above briefly example illustrates how filmic utterances 
might be considered ‘fluid’, organic, and even forward thinking. This is the most 
controversial and contested part of the filmosophy, the progressive notion that "[o]nce 
there were objects and cameras, now there is just film-thinking". Frampton is 
cautious, however, not to suggest that fluid thinking dominates the event: "[M]ost 
film-thinking is not as radically film-world-morphing as fluid film-thinking. Most 
film-thinking is formally layered over recognisably normal-looking characters and 
settings" (Frampton, 2006: 90- 91). Thus when considering a film’s ‘thinkings’ we 
should must be aware that it is the filmind itself that we are describing, not simply 
flashes of liquid thought, formal prose, or the basic building blocks of film-world 















































Most reviewers of Frampton’s Filmosophy immediately draw attention to its cover‘s 
claim of being “a manifesto for a radically new way of understanding cinema”. 
Frampton’s “maverick manifesto”, in the words of Screen’s Richard Rushton, 
embodies “bold attempts to rescue some territory for those film scholars who like to 
speculate on the far-flung possibilities of cinema” (2007: 222). Frampton’s Deleuzed 
arguments are contemporary, controversial, and have drawn fair criticism from 
established canons and classicists; but while filmosophy’s propositions are, indeed, 
‘radical’, they are also adaptive, inclusive and provide a compelling conceptual 
framework for doing philosophy.  
Goodenough and Smuts tackled the problem of ‘film-as-philosophy’ in a 
pragmatic and conscientious manner. They attempted to assert philosophy’s merger 
with cinema ‘hypodermically’ by pre-empting resistance and seeking an alternative 
entry into this new philosophical surface of cinematic enquiry. The ‘bold thesis’ they 
posit and problematise is largely a reactionary reconciliation to the intersection 
between the cinematic experience and philosophy. Filmosophy, however, has no 
desire to entertain any form of ‘soft’ bold thesis: “Rather it [film] must see, must seek, 
its own natural philosophicalness – that of revealing a new thinking, a new point of 
view about the world” (Frampton, 2006: 212).  
Filmosophy’s claims are, indeed, bold. And despite Frampton’s clear and 
concise structuring and argumentative style, many reviewers of Filmosophy are 
skeptical as to how, exactly, filmosophy might wholly and philosophically enrich the 
field and our cinematic experiences. The following section seeks to present a number 
of consistent criticisms set against Frampton’s radical manifesto in order to account, 
rebut, and assert some of the areas in which filmosophy has been considered 





Against Technicist Terms 
Tony McKibbin (2007), writing for Sense of Cinema, notes that although 
filmosophy could “quite fruitfully suggest tomorrow’s world utilising yesterday’s 
news” he is hesitant to dismiss, what Frampton continually refers to as, ‘technicist’ 
language and descriptors. Frampton (2006: 173) argues: “Technicist descriptive terms 
for moving sound-images forms obstruct the possible. They ground (limit) the 
meaning of forms in their technical make-up – the technical term pushes a certain 
understanding of the meaning of that particular form” and that these terms “are empty 
compared to suitable concepts of poetry and form”; technological terms “obscure[s] 
the possible poetic experience of film” (Frampton, 2006: 172). Throughout 
Frampton’s writings he argues that in order to advance cinema towards a more poetic 
understanding of the filmgoing experience—and thus a greater awareness of its 
philosophical potential—we must explore “more suitable and poetic reference terms 
for moving sound-image actions of form, and that these terms can come from 
understanding film as a new mode of thought” (Frampton, 2006: 171). 
However, Schmerheim argues that technical terms inform our background 
knowledge regarding film form. These descriptors “help identify precisely by which 
means a certain ‘film-thought’ has been achieved” and that Frampton “conflates post-
viewing film analyses with accounts of a film viewing experience” (Schmerheim, 
2008: 118). Schmerheim is not alone in his hesitancy to eject formal descriptions 
from discussions of film form and function (if it was at all possible). McKibbin 
(2007) continues in this vein, stating that Frampton “takes the argument too far” and 
proposes that such terms may still be salvaged, that film writers could “break it down 
in such a way that we can allow technical language not just to describe the film’s 
making, but also, very specifically, viewer perceptions”.  
This is a valid and common criticism of filmosophy, because although 
Frampton justifiably indicates that certain films and moments are obviously ill-served 
by technical descriptions, his writings fail to convincingly produce accounts of how, 
exactly, one might avoid the pitfalls of technological language. Frampton himself 
often slips back into technical descriptors but maintains that the filmgoer should 
ultimately be encouraged to “see thinking (thoughtful intention) rather than 




This research acknowledges the current, arguably unavoidable, value of 
technical descriptions, but shares Frampton’s concern over how these descriptions 
struggle to adequately articulate the more expressive, and technologically progressive, 
aspects of modern cinema. If we are to accept and explore Frampton’s manifesto on 
any level, academics and writers must view filmosophy’s ideas as a movement 
towards63 the future of film, one that does not simply abandon cinema’s historical 
accumulation of ideas and linguistically signifiers, but registers them and part of 
filmosophy’s inclusive foundations. 
 
Film Interpretation 
Parallel to the Framptonic ‘anti-technicist’ appeal is the extended criticism of 
filmosophical interpretation. This area of criticism suggests that Frampton is unable to 
successfully distinguish between the act of film going and that of interpretation. 
Schmerheim (2008:120) reminds us that: 
Talk about film experiences is always talk post facto. Writing in film 
studies is an attempt to make sense of the things we experience while 
watching a film, in some ways also an attempt to communicate what 
we have experienced, what film is doing with us. 
 
Schmerheim continues to say that Frampton “fails to see, or refuses to see, a 
distinction between film experience and film analysis”. Schmerheim’s statements 
suggest that the filmosophical approach to filmgoing is separated into one’s prior, 
immediate, and post film-viewing experiences. Indeed, there is a fundamental 
distinction to be made between the time we spend in the cinematic cave of 
consciousness, and our reflections on this hermetic enslavement. The freed slave who 
returns to the cave to, once again, gaze upon shadows will undoubtedly be encourage 
to employ his new found knowledge onto the flickering forms. But does their 
enlightenment enrich or detract from the enchantment and totality of the images being 
projected? Frampton (2006:151) is worth quoting at length here as he alludes to this 
conundrum: 
                                                
63 It is worth noting that Frampton is also cautious of his own neologisms and their limitations. 
Throughout Filmosophy he encourages the reader to departure from, even re-work, filmosophy’s 
neologisms. Suggesting, for example, that the filmind is purely conceptual and is strictly just the film; 
that ‘fluid’ is a description of cinematic thoughtfulness and not itself rigid or dogmatic in appearance; 
and even posits filmosophy as a framework—a ‘conceptual ladder’—to be used then discarded 
accordingly. His moves away from technical language (and his calls to invite more ‘poetic’ 
interpretations with appropriate articulation) are in service to cinema’s greater future and our 




[I]t seems somehow wrong to try and always equate film with real-life 
experience – the film experience is not strictly analogous to real-world 
audio-visual experience, and films are most certainly creating new 
ways of thinking and ‘perceiving’ above and beyond those of our real-
life experiences. We understand film fully, not by ‘likeness to real 
life’, but by our adaption to a new kind of thinking. 
 
A new kind of thinking requires new methods and approaches, a willingness to ‘re-
shackle’ ourselves within the ‘cine-cave’ despite having been exposed to the technical 
reality of the shadowy scratches, a ‘film-worldview’ that truly values film’s artistic 
intentions and thinkings. To suggest Frampton is somehow subverting the spatial and 
temporal sites of film reception and reflection is to, quite simply, miss the point of 
filmosophy. Frampton encourages individual, personal, meditations on any given 
feature, but cautions against, and challenges the importance of  ‘extra-textual’ 
intrusions (e.g. ‘real-world’ actors and auteurs, the technology used to create an 
effect, or even one’s own cognitive biases) when evaluating and, philosophically, 
interpreting a film: “Thoughtlessness is an ‘uncanny visitor’: ‘nowadays we take in 
everything in the quickest and cheapest way, only to forget it just as quickly, 
instantly…man today is in flight from thinking’” (Heidegger in Frampton, 2006:190).  
Frampton (2006:193) invokes Heidegger here as he moves towards “meditative film-
thinking” that “enacts a fluidity of instincts that dwells on moments, actions, scenes, 
or other aspects of the film-world”.  
In filmosophy meaning has a “beginning (immediately in the experience), a 
middle (though reflection and interpretation during and after the film), and seemingly 
never an end” (Frampton, 2006:167). The filmgoer is understood as an active part of 
the ‘mixing of consciousness’ that occurs during the cinematic event—a fusion of 
minds that requires reflection less the filmgoer be alienated, or reject the 
distinguishing differences between the film-world and the desired ‘real’. In this regard 
Frampton (2006:164) discusses “affective film-thinking” as the cognitive process that 
“communicates directly with a non-linguistic (perhaps subconscious) part of our 
minds”. To meditate on, and subsequently attach meaning to a film, is to open up the 
possibility of becoming fully immersed in its thinkings—to seemingly surrender pre-
filmic obstructions to existing, if at all, outside the sealed theatre of cinematic 
experience. Film interpretation may strictly be “post facto”, but those facts must, 




To quote one of Frampton’s more poetic points: “Film bleeds ideas. The 
rupturing of complex film-thinking creates spaces for ideas to appear” (Frampton, 
2006: 165). To enlist the comforting simplicities of extra-textual interpretation (e.g. 
invasive authorship inferences, revealing the technical mechanics of ‘the shot’, hyper-
contextualised ideological inferences, seeing actors over the characters they play, and 
so on) is to risk producing a damagingly tight tourniquet that pressures the very 
creativity and thought filmosophy wishes to see bleed out. We, as filmgoers, must 
accept the suicidal wills of the event itself and take pleasure in watching it die, in 
time; like the distance star we know not truly to be alive or dead, we must be 
dissuaded to speculate on the fantasy of a burning ‘source’ and the seduction of ‘after-
the-fact’ influences. Thus to speak of film-going and film-being is to put forward a 
type of Heideggerian ‘film-being-in-the-world’ that is first ‘unconditionally’ 
experienced, then—filmosophically—meditated on.  
 
Film-beings 
Filmosophy describes film-being as “a general term for what we understand to 
be the origin(ator) of the images and sounds we experience” (Frampton, 2006: 27). 
Frampton dedicates the first half of his manifesto to exploring how films create and 
re-create meaning, and in the process “ultimately dismisses several traditional ways of 
understanding film as a being” (Schmerheim, 2008:113). These include “film as 
camera ‘I’ or virtual creator, as ghostly or absent author, or as some kind of 
narratological or post-narratological being” (Frampton, 2006:27); all of which wish 
somehow to ‘locate’ a film’s meaning outside the text itself, beyond the confines of 
the theatre and the experiences as it were. Filmosophy rejects such approaches that 
infer a direct correlation between human cognition and those thoughts found in the 
filmind (i.e. as it moves towards film as a new form of thinking, as having its own 
‘mind’).  
Rushton (2008:226) is skeptical of filmosophy’s eagerness to “divorce human 
thought from the thinking of films”; idiomatically stating that it is “akin to throwing 
out the baby with the bathwater”. The perspective here is that Frampton’s unduly 
rejection of these various, historically appreciated, and still supported (especially for 
the social consumption of filmic fodder) approaches to filmgoing undermines the very 




films may indeed ‘think better than us’, but the only thoughts they can produce which 
will matter to us are those that pertain to human subjects”. Rushton’s criticisms are 
twofold: Firstly, that by rejecting the notion that the filmind can be likened to that of 
the human mind, filmosophy risks alienating any meaningful interpretation that may 
result from filmosophical enquiry. This is aligned with Livingston’s “problem of 
paraphrase”, but here Rushton is referring to filmosophy’s hyper-hermetic holism and 
its theoretical inability to return to the linguistic signifiers that make meaningful 
interpretation possible or even fruitful. Secondly, he is suspicious of Frampton’s 
propositions that the filmind is able to transcend human cognition, suggesting that if 
such a claim were true, filmosophy’s exclusiveness and rigid independence renders 
the concept moot in terms of how such ‘film-thinkings’ might then arrive at our 
senses.  
This nexus is considered by Frampton as the conscious encounter between the 
film and the filmgoer. Because the filmind is seemingly constituted in this 
engagement, this ‘mixing’ of conscious intent, the debate over whether or not the 
filmind’s thinkings differ, or are similar, to that of human cognition is somewhat 
nullified. Neither the filmind nor the actual filmgoers are mutually exclusive, and it is 
important to remember filmosophy’s emphasis on transsubjectivity and the “unique 
third thought” that emerges as a product of this ‘mixing’. So while filmosophy does 
not dispute its hermetic heuristics, it does not recognise such observations as valid 
critique; and while the thoughts of the filmind may perhaps only be meaningfully 
understood via human cognition, Frampton, like Livingston64, thus designates a 
certain degree of responsibility to the knowledgeable filmosophical filmgoer. 
 
Authorship 
Frampton’s discussions promote a hermetic system of enquiry that campaigns 
for exclusivity, independence, and an unwillingness to entertain any theological or 
scientified quests to deconstruct its worlds beyond the pure audio-visual experience. 
Filmosophical interpretation does not wish to devalue ‘extra-textual’ or transcendent 
influences, only to have film discussions depart from, and return to, the actual 
                                                
64 Livingston, like many others in favour of any form of cinematic connoisseurship, writes that the 
“philosophically-oriented interpreter of a film must take up the task of importing a well-defined 
problematique if aspects of the film's thematic and narrative design are to resonate with sufficiently 
sophisticated and well-articulated theses or arguments” (2006:15). (See Compositional Modality on 




cinematic event. Issues of authorship, for example, are not over-valued in filmosophy 
in so far as authorial signatures and other creative presences/signatures are not 
necessarily required, or even experientially beneficial, to film-viewing, and thus the 
filmosophical interpretation of a film. We do not need to know of Derek Jarman’s life 
story to be able to appreciate dissatisfaction and challenging of social order in Blue—
the film itself informs us of it by hijacking the visual spectacle and promoting the 
medium’s auditory components. In fact, filmosophy argues that such references often 
detract or mislead us from meaningful meditations, a point Frampton argues here 
reductico ad absurdum: “When film events end up as assertions of author control 
whole stretches of film can be consigned to stylistic megalomania without the need of 
creative explanations” (Frampton, 2006:29).  
What filmosophy attempts is to reassign the importance, or potency, of ‘real 
world’ creative forces (i.e. the actual filmmakers, the technologies and techniques 
employed, as well as the sociological site of the spectacle) to within the actual film, as 
‘thought of’ by the filmind. Thus filmosophy dissuades convenient author-attribution 
biases as the source of some mythical monist interpretation of the cinematic event 
(e.g. claiming a director’s comments, intentions, and personal histories as absolute 
cinematic truths. This is why, despite Luis Buñuel’s proclamation that the images in 
Un Chien Andalou are random and without purpose, we can still discuss the film as 
being, in this case psychoanalytically, significant/meaningful). Whether it be Orson 
Welles’ self-referential egotism as the director-actor in A Tough of Evil (1958) or 
Derek Jarman’s own socio-political experiences/philosophy outside of the poetics in 
Blue, what filmosophy achieves by protecting itself from the sociological lure of 
authorial fantasies is a purity of film-thought. It is a non-intrusive model from which 
such filmmaking intentions/influences are limited to the cinematic utterances those 
artists create. Their effects are, instead, felt and experienced rather than attributed 
through non-cinematic means.  
As far as filmosophy is concerned, god (i.e. the filmmaker and/or other 
‘technical talents’) is indeed ‘dead’ or dying, atomised by Laplace’s demon65 and their 
creative life forces dispersed within the lurid film-world the filmgoer is now adrift in. 
Just as we do not need (or want) to see the technical scaffolding to interpret its effect, 
so then are authorial influences appropriately rendered as extra-textual; and when 
                                                




these forces do interrupt the event, it must be acknowledged that the filmgoer has 
drifted into a falsified cinematic fantasy. For it is not the ‘real’ filmmaker we are 
inferring, but the ghostly residue of an absent (or apathetic) God who no longer exerts 
influence or is able to hold sermon—a cinematic clockwork universe that ticks on 
without its long-lost maker.   
Therefore film-beings in filmosophy are not in service to some seemingly 
estranged ‘authorial consciousness’, an off-screen or ‘invisible’ being, Booth’s 
‘implied author’, or any other omnipotent grandmaster or post-narratorial omnipotent 
entity.  Instead, filmosophy wishes, demands, “to bring the conceptualization of film-
beings back ‘into’ the film, and not suggest an external perspective” (Frampton 2006: 
38). Again, this does not mean that the filmosophical filmgoer is not interested in 
attributing praise or credit to the creative efforts that brought the filmind into being, 
but instead wishes “to bring creative intention back into the film, not take the filmgoer 
out of the film to some external invisible puppeteer” (Frampton, 2006:99). It is the 
view of filmosophy that valuing creativity and artistry starts and ends with the 
artwork itself; that a work of art is valued/admired through the very act of 
philosophical interpretation and discussion. Filmosophy thus differentiates between 
the sociological, technological, and philosophical spheres of cinematic influence, and 
embeds its efforts within the ‘site of the image’66. 
 
Narrative  
For film critics and scholars such as David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, 
one of most important approaches to film analysis occurs via discussions on 
narration—the structuring dimension of cinema that allows for stories to be conveyed 
in a meaningful manner. In filmosophy, however, narration is seen simply as evidence 
that the filmind is ordered, that it has been formed with story-telling intent and 
purpose. Schmerheim (2008:117) lampoons Frampton here, wryly voicing that “there 
do not seem to be many studies out there which specifically focus on the 
philosophical potential of cinematic means of expression which bypass narratological 
aspects”—but that is what filmosophy sets out to achieve, and does so without 
remorse or anxiety about its implications. Frampton argues that narrative “is not 
‘suited’ to the more imagistic, poetic, sublime moments of cinema” that it “struggles 
                                                




to handle these moments” (2006:112). Similar to filmosophy’s approach to technicist 
terms, filmosophy views narrative as containing the potential to enact order and 
structure to the filmind, but that it does not inherently invoke it as the sole origin of 
film meaning. 
Schmerheim holds the view that filmosophy is problematically ‘anti-
narrative’, and that the “hidden enemy” in Frampton’s work is the centred around the 
crowded “Bordwell-camp” (2008:115). Frampton does view Bordwell’s structuralist 
approach as, like various extra-texuals discussed previously, “somewhat cold and 
calculating” (Frampton, 2006:106); but maintains that the filmind is “not simply 
concerned with articulating stories” (Frampton, 2006:112). Because filmosophy 
wishes to encompass cinema in its entirety, not simply narrative cinema, the theory 
restricts (not wholly abandons) discussions on narrative to the functions of the 
filmind. The filmind, quite clearly, “can tell stories if they so wish” and thus narration 
is “one result of film-thinking, a certain type of thinking, one which lines-up plot and 
characters to tell a story” (Frampton, 2006:113).  
Just as a film might ‘choose’ to think about its technical construction (i.e. self-
reflexive and self-referential features), the filmind may also engage in specific 
thinkings of narrative—“Cinema always narrates what the image’s movements and 
times make it narrate” (Deleuze quoted in Frampton, 2006:103). Filmosophy is an 
inclusive approach that favours theoretical breadth and depth, rather than over-valuing 
the sociological and technical strictures narratology promotes. Appropriate 
interpretations may arise from narrative, but their meaningfulness is attributed in 
filmosophy to the filmind itself—within its thinkings of filmic characters and events. 
Just as issues of authorship are seen as largely a sociological, extra-textual, concern, 
so filmosophy “wishes to reveal the complexity of film, not attempt to reduce it to 
norms and non-norms” (Frampton, 2006:108, 114).  
This is an important distinction to make in general with regards to the criticisms 
against filmosophy, because while filmosophy may be skeptically treated as being a 
theoretically sterile approach, its scaffolding actually allows for, but also regulates, 
the extent and claim such invasive templates have on film interpretation. In 
psychoanalytical film theory, for example, film is argued to resemble, or at least made 
analogous to, dreams. And while filmosophy rejects this all-inclusive oneiric meta-




chooses to think like a dream67. Similarly, one may even argue that non-fiction forms 
of film (e.g. documentaries) may, perhaps, be more akin to human cognition than its 
fictional brethren. The point to be made here is one of intention, that the filmind has 
the capacity to enact various forms of thinking, of which narrative, dream, authorship, 
and so on are included. The question, philosophically, is not whether or not a given 
feature is narratively structure or not, but rather that there is structure and how the 
film is thinking about its own ordering and presentation. 
 
Application and Examples 
Generally speaking, despite the heavy criticisms against Frampton’s 
Filmosophy most reviewers of his work are cautiously optimistic about its future 
course, but remain largely unconvinced due to lack of engaging and detailed examples 
and case studies. Rushton, who perhaps presents one of the more balanced critiques of 
Frampton’s effort, concludes his review of Filmosophy for Screen by saying that one 
of most disappointing areas is Frampton’s actual analysis of films (Rushton, 
2007:223). Similarly, Schmerheim (2008:119) admits his own “inability to get 
Frampton’s point in his film examples”.  Frampton does, however, in his discussion 
of film-thinking, dedicate a fair word count to presenting and discussing a healthy 
batch of films by such notably directors as Bela Tarr, Michael Haneke, and brothers 
Jean Pierre and Luc Dardenne, but critics have remained unmoved and largely left 
wanting.  
Schmerheim (2008:122), in one of the more damning and dismissive reviews, 
rounds out his berating of Frampton’s Filmosophy by contemptuously adding: “I’d 
rather go to the next fine movie around the corner than to witness the next round of 
this intellectual war”. Again, if Frampton was able to elicit any excitement in the 
minds of film writers and philosophers, such energy was diffused by, what many 
perceive as, a skimpy diet of examples that failed to persuade. However to say that 
Frampton is engaged in some form of “intellectual war” is sharp, a snappy hook on 
which Schmerheim hangs his own reluctance to evaluate Frampton’s ideas and 
explore their potential. Filmosophy, on the contrary, is an openly unifying movement, 
one that is more aligned to Wilson’s thinkings in Consilience: The Unity of 
                                                




Knowledge (1998) than that of some authoritarian manifesto promoting rigidity and 
submission:  
Of course the regular description and the filmosophical one may be 
revolving around similar meanings, but the filmosophical one, with its 
unifying of form and intention, leads to further possible 
interpretations. The unifying of form and content using the concept of 
film-thinking creates an integral whole for the filmgoer. (Frampton, 
2006:101) 
 
This “integral whole” that is being created for the filmgoer is not phenomenological 
world altering, it is world revealing, the conceptual planchette that is already in play 
exerting and absorbing conscious forces that came before its placement on the field. 
And if filmosophy has but one truly uncontested ‘founding principles’, it is that going 
to fine features (around whatever corner) with the intent to enjoy means you are on 
the right track—whether you believe in thinking or not. But perhaps Schmerheim is 
ahead of the game here, for Frampton’s open invitation also comes with, like all 
secret messages with a specific reader in mind, a ‘self-destruct’ button of sorts: 
[Filmosophy is a] conceptual ladder, to be climbed then kicked away. 
Film does not technically need a filmind – filmosophy is not an 
empirical investigation – it is a decision by filmgoers whether to use 
this concept when experiencing a film. (Frampton, 2006:99) 
 
This research is encouraged by ‘Frampton’s ladder’68 and aims to explore both its 
current reach and its potential to invite new and exciting interpretations in modern 
moviemaking. However this research does acknowledge filmosophy’s infancy, and 
the following section therefore aims to present a methodological orientation from 
which Frampton’s ladder can gain some theoretical footing—as a proposed launch 







                                                
68 A term coined here to describe Frampton’s theory as a disposable, compostable, conceptual tool used 
to arrive at meaningful philosophical propositions; a type of ‘throw-away’ theory of cinema—a 











In this section filmosophy’s stance towards its subject matter will be abstracted and 
discussed along three axioms: the filmind ontological orientations; its philosophical 
approach to knowledge and interpretation (epistemology); and how such an approach 
could be appropriated into any accountable approach to modern cinema (critical 
visual methodology). The challenge of this is laid out in one of Frampton’s final 
remarks in Filmosophy: 
Filmosophy is a product of our current age of plastic malleable cinema. 
It is also a product of our current age of knowledge about cinema 
conventions: an unlearning, a more ‘suitable’, more cinematic 
reconceptualisation. (Frampton, 2006:212) 
 
The filmosophical filmind spearheads this move towards reconceptualising today’s 
shapable cinema along ‘postmetaphysical’, ‘postphenomenological’, and 
‘transsubjective’ lines of inquiry. Towards deconstructing and contextualising these 
grandiose terms, the filmind will first be ascribed an ontological bearing through 
Slavoj Žižek’s discussions on ‘ontological difference’—the “ultimate parallax which 
conditions our very access to reality” (Žižek, 2006:10); then Edward O. Wilson’s 
unifying theory of knowledge (consilience) will be presented to support filmosophical 
interpretation; and, lastly, this research will seek analytical asylum within the “site of 
the image” found in Gillian Rose’s ‘critical visual methodology’. 
Frampton clearly states that filmosophy "offers a practice, a skill to do 
something; a strategy for being philosophical about film and seeing the philosophy in 
film” (2006:212); therefore by presenting and consolidating these contemporary 
theories (i.e. Žižek’s “Parallax View”, Wilson’s “Consilience”, and Rose’s “Critical 
Visual Methodology”) along filmosophy’s own axiomatic dimensions, this research 
aims to construct a clearer orientation of filmosophy’s ‘film-worldview’ for the 







In his dissection of Goodenough’s philosophical film-being, Rybin extracted 
an ontological dimension in order to account for films’ unique and constituting 
essences. Classically, there have been two tensions: formalism and realism; the 
former is attributed to the Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein, while the latter to 
French film theorist/critic André Bazin (Rybin, 2009:56). Rybin writes that cinema’s 
historiography provides a “fecund resource for filmmakers and critics seeking to 
harness and reflect upon the stylistic possibilities of film in particular ways and for 
particular purposes” (Rybin, 2009:61). Filmosophy argues that this ‘purpose’ is of 
ultimate philosophical concern, one that can be historically sourced, but is uniquely 
transfigured in the light of cinema’s contemporary mindings and social influences. 
Recent advancements in digital morphing and animation have given us unprecedented 
cause to reconceptualise our understanding of the nature and being of film, and this is 
exactly what Frampton arrives at with the ‘filmind’ and ‘film-thinking’.  
Film-thinking in filmosophy is ‘transsubjective’ in nature because the “film’s 
perspective is [of] the whole film”, and that the filmind intends from a “non-place or 
realm”69 (Frampton, 2006:86). Frampton is drawing attention to the natural 
contradiction stemming from ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ simplifications prominent in 
our current film-thinkings (i.e. that the audience is subjected to the cinema’s essential 
objectifications, its socio-politically, and so ideological, regard). However, 
filmosophy maintains that extracted impressions of subject/object are, quite simply, 
“just the film thinking” (Frampton, 2006:85).  
Similarly, Žižek’s interpretation of the cinematic ‘gaze’ accuses the ‘politically-
minded’ object of ‘tickling70’ the touchy subject, and so the gaze in filmosophy 
“refers to the way that film’s objects regards the filmgoer” (Frampton, 2006:85). But 
where does Žižek’s supposed ‘tickling’ take place in filmosophy? What ‘realm’ can 
the filmind said to rule or engage us? These questions reverberate within Žižek’s 
progressive theory of the “parallax view”: the “constantly shifting perspective 
between two points which no synthesis or mediation is possible” (Žižek, 2006:4).  
 
                                                
69 See The Demonic Filmind’s Eye-view on page 50. 
70 Žižek writes that: “Thus the paradox is that the roles are reversed (in terms of the standard notion of 
the active subject working on the passive object): the subject is defined by a fundamental passivity, and 




Ontological Difference—The Ultimate Parallax 
In The Parallax View, arguably the Slovenian’s thinker’s greatest work, Žižek 
(2006:10) introduces three main modes of his ‘parallax gap’: the philosophical 
(Universal), scientific (Particular) and the political (Singular). While all modes can be 
meaningfully described through cinema (a fluidity of thought that Žižek himself often 
indulges in as he continues to carve up his own continental diet of examples), for the 
purpose of this research only the first, the ultimate or “ontological difference”, will be 
discussed as it correlates with filmosophy’s immediate ontological orientation.  
 According to Žižek, the parallax of ontological difference arises out of the 
“discord between the ontic and the transcendental-ontological” and that “we cannot 
reduce the ontological horizon to its ontic ‘roots,’ but neither can we deduce the ontic 
domain from the ontological horizon; that is to say, transcendental constitution is not 
creation71” (2006:7). This “transcendental constitution” suggests a ‘dual-aspect’ 
monistic72 approach towards the subject/object dilemma in film (as an integral part of 
the ‘mind-body’ dilemma), assimilated logically via paraconsistent means73 to 
dissuade entropy and deconstructionists’ decanting. So while we can, sociologically 
speaking, identify a subject (the ‘flesh-and-blood’ viewer or spectator) and the object 
(as the product and presentation of creative intent), they are, when divorced or even 
re-married, inadequate as concepts for explaining or advancing our understanding of 
cinema’s rapidly expanding neo-mindings and metaphors. But, as Frampton’s 
‘throwaway’ and compostable ladder fatalistically understands, this gap is ultimately 
“irreducible and insurmountable”, a permanent non-feature of film-being which Žižek 
calls the “ultimate parallax”—the ‘pure difference’ between the “’ontological’ 
horizon and ‘objective’ ontic reality” (Žižek, 2006:10).  
The filmind’s ‘non-place’ of address is understood through Žižek’s 
philosophical parallax in order to conceptually move beyond the dualist, and monist, 
                                                
71 This “transcendental constitution” is may appear to contradict Frampton’s film-world (i.e. its 
creational/re-creational function), but it is important to remember that the film-world is but one 
dimension of filmosophy’s filmind and not itself a descriptor of film-being.  
72 That “certain substances [cinema]…that are intrinsically neither material nor mental. Nevertheless 
these substances can present themselves under the aspect of the mental and the aspect of the physical.” 
(Stubenberg, 2013) 
73 Paraconsistent logic “accommodates inconsistency in a sensible manner that treats inconsistent 




models of consciousness and their own problematic inconsistencies74. Film is 
inherently, and constantly, mediating this relationship (cogito ergo sum/sum ergo 
cogito—“I think, therefore I am”/”I am, therefore I think”); it is the “philosophical 
twist” (Žižek, 2006:17) in Žižek’s parallax that says that it is not just a change in 
subjective position that displaces the object ‘out there’, but that both are ‘contained’ 
or considered through their mutual transcendental constitution. Therefore an 
“’epistemological’ shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects an ‘ontological’ 
shift in the object itself” (Žižek, 2006:17). Filmosophy views such shifts as ‘fluid-
thoughts’ that registers the “minimal”, or “pure”, difference the conceptualisation 
filmind and the filmgoer, as that which “cannot be grounded in positive substantial 
properties” (Žižek, 2006:18). 
Such contemplation leads Frampton to forcefully articulate filmosophy’s as 
being ‘postmetaphysical’ as well as ‘postphenomenological’. It is ‘postmetaphysical’ 
because film-thinking is “beyond our thinking (and helps us understand our 
thinking)”; and, similarly, it is  ‘post phenomenological’ as it attends to itself in a 
unique phenomenological light (Frampton, 2006:91-92). In both cases Frampton 
prefixing “post-“ emphasises that both axioms are, through their transcendental 
engagement, able to provide a theoretical perspective into our own thinkings (i.e. a 
perspective on metacognition), as we attend to thoughtfulness itself. This is why 
filmosophy claims an “affective film-mind” and persists in describing cinema’s 
‘mixing’ of consciousness: “Film operates beyond the objective and subjective 
thought, and in fact slides them together” (Frampton, 2006:201-202). Such tectonic 
collisions are transfiguring forces in filmosophy, the ‘minimal difference’ of which is 
fluidly enacted and atomised, rather than simply displaced—a Laplacian worldview 
that sees cinema’s unique, pure audio-visual, essences call wantonly to the 
filmosopher’s sapiosexual afflictions. 
 
Epistemological Assumptions 
Frampton (2006:176) states that, ontologically, “film contains no language, 
but the filmgoer constructs the meaning from the moving sound-images (the utterable 
itself)”. Filmgoers are not the inactive subjects of objective creative activity; nor are 
                                                
74 “We should take a step further and reach beneath this dualism itself, into a “minimal difference” (the 
noncoincidence of the One with itself) that generates it.” (Žižek, 2006:10)—a theorectical reach that 




they completely active interpreters of the filmind’s passive presentations. Instead, the 
filmind and the filmgoer are orbiting Žižek primary parallax and acquiring 
meaningfulness—they are two distinct, yet synchronised, soliloquies that are 
constantly dead reckoning their own ‘pure differences’. Frampton (2006:156) tells us 
that the “filmgoer that is active in thinking with and against the film, but who is also 
open to the film, [is] ready (conceptually) to receive its subtle thinkings in their 
subconscious”. The filmgoer “does not so much ‘identify’ with the film as ‘join’ it in 
the creation of a third thinking”; an event that is intellectually enriched through our 
“recognition of film’s capabilities of thinking”—and there we discover “a new way of 
encountering film” (Frampton, 2006:162-3).  
Filmosophy’s encounter with this kind of ‘third thinking’ is, again, not sustained 
by passive submission, or by simply ‘opening’ oneself to a given film’s mindings. The 
filmind’s transsubjective omniscience is made available via the filmgoer’s own 
individuated unconscious reservoir that consciously informs film-being and 
interpretation; or, in Frampton’s own words, it is the “film plus the filmgoer’s 
environment of experience, cultural inclinations, historical position and general needs 
and desires” (Frampton, 2006:164). 
 
Filmosophy and Consilience 
In arriving at filmosophy’s transcendentally constituted and thoughtful 
worldview, this research argues that Frampton’s Filmosophy makes progress towards 
consilience: the unity of knowledge that seeks “the means by which the single mind 
can travel most swiftly and surely from one part of the communal mind to the other” 
(Wilson, 1998:13). In filmosophy, the “communal mind” (i.e. the film) is made 
analogous to the filmgoer’s (“single mind”) engagement with the filmind. Therefore it 
is submitted that filmosophy’s fluid film-thinking is the very means-by-which the 
filmind can be said to ‘think’ Wilson’s displacing—or ‘parallaxing’—mind; a re-
creational ‘essencing’ from pure difference, transcendentally constituted, that is not 
itself a creation, but a neo-thought qua thought. Frampton’s filmosopher is, therefore, 
more akin to the creative and conscientious curator than a ‘professional’ filmgoer—to 
Maxwell’s Demon75—selecting and ushering in faster and heavier ‘thinkings’—rather 
than that of Laplace’s ‘Intellect’ (the filmind) and its monopoly on omniscience.  
                                                




In Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author 
Edward O. Wilson (1999:9) writes that “[t]he strongest appeal of consilience is in the 
prospect of intellectual adventure” and it is a “metaphysical world view, and a 
minority one at that, shared by only a few scientists and philosophers”.  This research 
argues that Frampton is part of this minority, and that not only is filmosophy itself a 
product of this quest, but that its claims and consequences call, through filmosophical 
interpretation, to a type of epistemological unity moving forward.  
Frampton’s ladder can be considered a form of ‘vertical consilience’, one that 
inductively defers cross-theoretical accounts of film phenomena towards a critically 
unified meta-film theory. If a film can, like filmosophy posits, “show anything, be 
anything, go anywhere, think anything” (Frampton, 2006:205), then it is (as 
Livingston concurs) enlightening, challenging, and indeed necessary to attempt to 
tinker with/through Wilson’s theoretical clockwork universe in a more serious and 
searching light. 
Both Frampton and Wilson have to consequentially ‘convince’ philosophers 
themselves about their new approach to knowledge. Filmosophy claims an 
unequivocal “bold thesis” that posits: “film is the beginning and the future of our 
thought” (Frampton, 2006:213); Wilson also clearly stresses the importance, saying 
that philosophy “peers into the future to give shape to the unknown—and that has 
always been its vocation of choice” (Wilson, 1998:11). Similarly, while Frampton 
marches against technical descriptors and the like, Wilson notes that “[t]he unification 
agenda does not sit well with a few professional philosophers. The subject I address 
they consider their own, to be expressed in their language, their framework of formal 
thought” (Wilson, 1998:11). The advantage Frampton has over Wilson in getting 
traction for the ‘unification agenda’ is that filmosophy is itself already a philosophical 
mode of enquiry, one that Goodenough, Livingston, Rybin, Smuts and the like, are 
already trying to promote and problematise.   
 
Vertical Consilience and Interpretation 
Wilson (1998:216) believes interpretation has “multiple dimensions, namely 
history, biography, linguistics, and aesthetic judgement. At the foundation of them all 
lie the material processes of the human mind”. Frampton (2006:178-180) tells us that 




that “[t]he concepts and attentions of filmosophy are not intended to provide complete 
interpretations, but can be used as a first step, a route to larger interpretations”. To 
interpret a film filmosophically, in the light of consilience, is to hold open the door for 
various branches/traditions of film-thinking—to invite different schools and 
disciplines to add their ‘energies’, language, insight, and viewpoints into this new 
philosophy of filmind. Not simply to ‘square the circle’ of critical film-thinking, but, 
and perhaps more importantly, to reveal and advance philosophy itself as it “affects 
our way of understanding life, because it affects our ways of perceiving our lives” 
(Frampton, 2006:209).  
Filmosophy assumes, to some degree, a type of ‘horizontal’ consilience 
through its hermetic understanding of the filmind (i.e. its “ontological difference”), 
and promotes investigation into ‘vertical’ consilience through the filmosophical 
filmgoer’s ‘heterophenomenological’ responsibility. This ‘vertical’ consilience is not 
achieved simply through some “lone-wolf autophenomenology”, but rather through a 
“third-person methodology” that takes “phenomenology of another not oneself” (i.e. 
‘postphenomenology’). Daniel Dennett (2003:1) claims this is the way “to take the 
first person point of view as seriously as it can be taken”, and while he is referring 
specifically to the scientific method, this ‘third-person methodology’ is still both 
appropriate and useful in addressing and conceptualising Frampton’s ‘third-
thought/mind’. For the heterophenomenologist, like the filmosopher, the “primary 
data are the utterances, the raw, uninterpreted data” (Dennett, 2003:3). Utterances of 
the filmind (fluid or otherwise) are found in Frampton’s ‘pure audio-visual’ spectrum 
of filmic awareness that the filmosophical filmgoer provides insight and meaning into 
by taking such utterances as seriously as possible.  
Dennett concludes his defence of the “neutrality of heterophenomenology” 
with words that strongly resonates with filmosophical concerns as it “accepts the 
challenge of demonstrating, empirically, in its terms, that there are marvels of 
consciousness that cannot be captured by conservative theories” (Dennett, 2003:12). 
Again, in filmosophy theorectical conservatism arrives when the filmgoer over-values 
and misplaces the interpretations found through approaches like narratology, auteur 
theory, and other technicist deconstructions and socio-political inferences.  
This research aims to explore filmosophy’s concepts and intuitions about the 




interpretations of those more poetic and lucid utterances found in popular modern 
cinema. It is not within this research’s scope to assert Wilson’s consilience in its 
totality (i.e. biological accounts of film-being or map vertical integration to its fullest 
potential) but instead demonstrate filmosophy’s own internal validity and reliability 
through the vertical integration of theoretical approaches to specific, and modern, 
cinematic utterances. Filmosophy does not, as mentioned, abandon narrative, auteur 
theory, mise en scène analysis, ideological readings, and so on; but instead seeks 
inductively to extract and assign a greater purpose and placement to these areas 
through a philosophy of filmind. To this end, this research will employ, discern, and 
enact tenets of psychoanalytical film theory alongside filmosophy to help articulate 
the enigmatic and fluid film-thoughts identified within the two films presented. And in 
doing so demonstrate how comparative film theory coalesces within filmosophy to 
arrive at meaning interpretations of progressive pictures.   
 
Filmosophy and Psychoanalysis 
Jerome Appelbaum (2013:117) purposes a “nurturing dialogue as 
psychoanalysis and philosophy move forward” (an approach that Žižek has long 
employed himself through with his psychoanalytical and philosophical breadth and 
influences) and, like filmosophy, believes that “[b]racketing the past is not forgetting 
the past”. This nurturing dialogue can be ‘consilient’ in nature as it “entails and is 
rooted in a consideration of the commonality of their principal concerns” 
(Applebaum, 2013:118). Applebaum’s brief thoughts appear in a special edition of the 
American Journal of Psychoanalysis and “recognizes and affirms that both 
psychoanalysis and philosophy are wellsprings of mutual inspiration” (Applebaum, 
2013:119); a view that this research shares as it openly employs psychoanalytical 
insights through filmosophy’s epistemological call to its proposed vertical 
consilience. 
Like narratology and mise en scène analysis, this research does not wish to 
embark on a psychoanalytical reading ad libitum, but rather call upon it as a 
posteriori knowledge that can assist in arriving at meaningful and informative 
filmosophical interpretations; especially, as it will be shown, when psychoanalysis is 
applied to cinema’s more dreamy and fluid poetics. Psychoanalysis does not claim a 




represents a valuable ‘searchlight’ sub-theory that moves to discover modern 
cinema’s own ‘plastic malleability’.  
 
Critical Visual Methodology 
Having presented and outlined an ontological and epistemological orientation 
for filmosophical thought to engage, the following aims to claim analytical asylum 
within Gillian Rose’s ‘critical visual methodology’. Rose’s visual methodologies are, 
like filmosophy, a product of our current age of ocularcentrism76 and outlines visual 
research methods that use “various kinds of images as ways of answering research 
questions, not by examining images—as do visual culture studies—but by making 
them” (Rose, 2012:10).  
Before presenting her modalities and methods for addressing visual materials, 
Rose puts forth three ‘criteria’ for her proposed critical visual methodology: the 
research must “take images seriously” (a stance mirroring that of Dennett’s 
heterophenomenology), consider the “social conditions and effects of visual objects”, 
and engage the researcher’s “own way of looking at images77” (Roses, 2012:17). 
These three criteria have been shown to be inherent in the act of filmosophising (with 
arguably a softer stance on the ‘social conditions’ in so far as it informs the research’s 
heterophenomenological validity), and when transposed into Rose’s critical visual 
methodology, filmosophy’s focus and nuanced call to consilience can be specifically 
placed in order to defend Frampton’s Filmosophy from its own continental drift 
towards methodological obscurantism.  
 
The Site of the Image 
Gillian Rose (2012:19) states the interpretation of visual images falls broadly 
under three sites: “the site(s) of the production of an image, the site(s) of the image 
itself, and the site(s) where it is seen by audiences”. In addition to these three sites, 
Rose produces three further categories, or ‘modalities’, that may affect the critical 
interpretation of visual materials: technological, compositional, and social modalities 
(Rose, 2012:19-20). Her model is represented and labelled in her book as follows: 
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Fig. 1. The sites, modalities and methods for interpreting found visual material 
(Rose, 2012:43). 
 
Frampton’s ladder finds footing in both Rose’s proposed “site of the image” and its 
compositional modality. The “site of image” is primarily concerned with the 
importance of the image’s own effects and holds that “an image may have its own 
effects that exceed the constraints of its production (and reception)” (Rose, 2012:27-
28). Discussions and interpretations of visual culture (e.g. films, paintings, digital 
images) often over-value the cultural context in which those images are produced, and 
as a result visual researchers do not pay enough attention to the “specificities” of 
particular images (Rose, 2012:28).  
The American historian Michael Ann Holly (quoted in Cheetham et al., 
2005:88) argues that researchers “have sacrificed a sense of awe at the power of an 
overwhelming visual experience, wherever it might be found, in favour of the 
‘political’ connections that lie beneath the surface of this research is to devalue the 
image under question”. Further stating that she yearns for something that is “in excess 
of research”:  
How do we generate the very conditions for ‘wonder’ to take place – 
whether it’s a more philosophical or a critical ‘wonder’ at the character 




singularity, how they work, mean, fail to be intelligible, etc? (Holly 
quoted in Cheetham, et al., 2005:88) 
 
Filmosophy aims to reinstate this cinematic wonder by re-addressing the conceptual 
tools we use to evaluate, interpret, and assign philosophical significance to 
contemporary features. Rose (2012:29) also notes that “[s]cholars such as Laura 
Marks and Mark Hansen emphasise the embodied and the experiential as what lies in 
excess of representation”. This research is thus firmly placed within Rose’s “site of 
image” as it explores the representational and the more elusive latent, awe-inspiring, 
essences and poetics—those cinematic utterances that are considered, 
filmosophically, as pertaining directly to Frampton’s fluid film-thinking. 
 
Compositional Modality 
Roses “compositional modality” refers to the “specific material qualities of an 
image or visual object” that “draws on a number of formal strategies” (Rose, 
2012:20). These formal strategies are related to Frampton’s formal film-thinking, as 
unique and recognisable cinematic elements that inform our conception of fluid film-
thinking but also areas of basic film composition (their aspiring aesthetic qualia). In 
this modality the research “involves an act of interpretation78” (Hansen, 1998:131), 
and it is therefore neither methodologically nor theoretically explicit (Rose, 2012:52).  
However, Rose (2012:58-74) does identify a number of “schematic device[s]” 
that may guide such an approach, but notes that compositional analysis does 
ultimately refer to their combined effect. These devices or strategies include: content, 
colour, spatial organisation, montage, light, and the image’s expressive content. The 
“expressive content” is the “‘mood’ or ‘atmosphere’ of an image” (Rose, 2012:74) 
and describes the combined effect of images’ “subject matter and visual form” 
(Taylor quoted in Rose, 2012:74)—the filmic aerosphere in which philosophically 
significant and unique knowledge gathers ready for meaningful interpretation and 
discussion.  
Rose’s “schematic devices” are therefore akin to mise en scène analysis, and 
their concerns do overlap to a large degree. John Gibbs defines mise-en-scène as 
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“visual connoisseurship” that involves a “detailed vocabulary for expressing the appearance of an 





simply “the contents of the frame and the way that they are organised” (Gibbs, 
2002:5) and identifies ten elements for analysing the moving image: lighting, 
costume, colour, props, décor, action and performance, space, position of the camera, 
framing, and the interaction of elements (Gibbs, 2002:8-26). Both Rose’s schematic 
devices and Gibbs’ elements help to identified important utterances with the filmind, 
but they are, like Goodenough’s modes of filmosophical being, critically bracketed 
within filmosophy.  
This research acknowledges the value of such mise en scène cues, but defers 
to Frampton’s own “basic fields of film composition” (Frampton, 2006:116)—image, 
colour, sound, focus, speed, frame, movement and edit-shifts—as the primary points 
of departure for its analysis towards illustrating filmosophy’s fluid film-thinking at 
play. That said, Gibbs discussion on “coherence” should be noted as he also accounts 
for film’s “recurrent strategies” (Gibbs, 2002:39). Gibbs’ discussion on coherence 
highlights the importance of motifs and visual patterns when considering a film’s 
organisation: 
This paradigm [coherent relationships] has sometimes been described 
as organicism, because of its emphasis on an ‘organic’ relationship 
between the parts and the whole—that is, the relationship between 
elements in the admired artwork seems natural and mutually beneficial 
rather than being too obviously constructed or nugatory. The whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts. (Gibbs, 2002,40) 
 
In his discussion, Gibbs mentions two ways in which coherence can be addressed in 
film. Firstly, that coherence describes the function of motif: “an element with 
acquires significance through repetition…[and includes]…consistency of tone and 
viewpoint, and the qualification that the individual elements receives from its 
context” (Gibbs, 2002:40). Secondly, we can take note of how different elements 
within a single moment “interact to achieve a significant effect” (Gibbs, 2002:40-41). 
The ‘synthesis’ of constituting elements within the frame can thus help articulate the 
image’s “expressive content”—a goal shared by filmosophy as it engages with 
exclusively with film’s pure audio-visual mode of engagement. 
Rose (2012:55) indicates that because compositional interpretation “neglects 
both socially specific ways of seeing and the representations of the social” (similar to 
filmosophy), many who employ this approach are usually accompanied by other 




interpretation “does seem to be the method of choice for some of those theorists of 
visual culture concerned to emphasise the nonrepresentational” (Rose, 2012:55). This 
is filmosophy’s ultimate goal as the filmgoer “might not just begin to understand 
their environment cinematically, but may begin to look for difference ‘information’ 
in the world” (Frampton, 2006:209). 
 
Filmosophical Interpretation  
This research offers a filmosophical interpretation of two unique, contemporary, 
and topical films—Terrence Malick’s award-winning and enigmatic The Tree of Life 
(2011) and Alfonso Cuarón’s spacey new-age thriller Gravity (2013)—through which 
filmosophy’s core concepts will be explored and expanded. It will be shown that these 
two innovative features stand as, and contain, exemplary examples of filmosophy’s 
core concepts of the filmind, film-world creation, and film-thinking. It will be 
demonstrated that Gravity and The Tree of Life contain clear and creative accounts of 
fluid film-thinking at play in modern moviemaking, and specific filmic utterances and 
sequences will be identified and discussed (along Frampton’s six proposed forms of 
composition) in order to explore the validity of, and criticisms against, filmosophy. 
However before such interpretations it is necessary to discuss filmosophy’s approach 
to writing as it pertains directly to the type of interpretation that follows.  
 
Filmosophical Language   
The follow filmosophical interpretation involves examining specific filmic 
utterances as philosophically relevant spaces in film-time, and it is through valuing 
the dramatic intent of specific audio-visual moments (in light of filmind’s eye-view) 
that we gain access to filmosophy’s potential. When considering a filmind’s thoughts 
philosophically one may ask: “What are we thinking now? Or, post-viewing, “What 
were we thinking then?” These questions directly address and describe the collision of 
consciousness (the ‘ultimate parallax’) that constitutes the cinematic experience. Such 
an approach ensures that precedence is given to the film moments in question, their 
unique experiential quality that is then paraphrased and expressed through 
filmosophical writing. Frampton dedicates an entire chapter in Filmosophy to film 
writing, and so towards addressing both Gravity and The Tree of Life—as “intuitive, 




outline Frampton’s notes of filmosophical writing as he moves towards a “humanistic 
thoughtful poetics” of filmosophical interpretation (Frampton, 2006:178).  
Frampton (2006:177) argues that “[n]ew films demand new vocabularies” and 
that by liberating ourselves from the strictures of, for example, technicist language we 
may hope to “intuitively welcomes the affective meaning of the film” (Frampton, 
2006:178). Filmosophy’s approach to writing is as progressively pressing as it is 
liberating. Metaphors, analogies, neologisms and poetic verse are valued insofar as 
they produce and/or enhance the possible interpretative meaning/insight the filmind-
goer in question generates. Filmosophical interpretation starts and ends with the 
filmgoer and “[w]hat we feel on initial encounter becomes the path of suitable 
interpretation” (Frampton, 2006:178). Therefore the language we use must embody 
this unique mixing towards producing insightful and fitting interpretations.  
When the filmgoer asks, “What are we thinking now?” we are observing the 
stirring the filmind’s thinkings with our own and, therefore, “how suitable our 
thinking is depends on our knowledge and language” (Frampton, 2006:176). The 
filmosopher is not simply the erudite filmgoer, but also a logophile, poet, and enacter 
of personal knowledge set on enhancing the film’s mindings (filmind) through the 
meditative meeting of that knowledge and the utterances being experienced—a 
oneiric wordsmith who is constantly seeking to express the medium’s own unique and 
artistic intent in the most appropriate, insightful, and meaningful manner possible.  
 
Metaphors, Thought-Experiments and Intuitions  
Philosophers have long since employed the imaginative capacity of thought-
experiments and the power of metaphor to assists them in conveying complex 
conceptual ideas and testing theories. Lucretius throw a spear at the edge of the 
universe, Plato imagined slaves in caves, Schrödinger put a cat in box, Chalmers 
contemplated the p-zombie, and Galileo even proved the objects of different mass fall 
at the same rate simply by thinking about it. Thought-experiments are potent 
philosophical tools that describe “a nonactual situation, and [they invite] the reader to 
make a judgment about an aspect of this situation” (Machery, 2011:194); they are 
imaginative metaphors that problematise specific phenomena or situations with the 
intent of enhancing our understanding, or the implications of, the experiments 




Machery (2011:191) reminds us that thought-experiments have “an important 
role to play in the growth of philosophical knowledge”; however Smuts (2009:414) 
writes that: 
The problem with the thought experiment argument for film as 
philosophy is that it does not show how films could do philosophy, 
much less innovative philosophy, only how we could do philosophy 
with a film. 
 
Smuts claims that arguments by analogy can, however, be fashioned from uniquely 
cinematic means to alleviate the issue of paraphrase (Smuts, 2009:414); as with those 
comparisons that “suggests that because two things are alike in some ways they are 
probably alike in other important ways” (Smuts, 2009:415). Comparisons are useful 
and philosophically significant and create new arches from which new ideas and 
thinkings can resonant. Frampton endorses these creative and cognitive tools in 
shaping new film-thoughts, believing that “images and analogies, metaphors seem to 
create an immediate connection with the reader, and within philosophical writing they 
further work to invite appraisal, in pushing different lines of enquiry for us to actively 




























The previous sections outlined and problematised filmosophy as a contemporary 
approach to film-going, as well as outlined a methodological orientation from which 
new and progressive interpretations may arise. What follows is a filmosophical 
interpretation of two contemporary features that aims to detail how filmosophy can be 
further conceptualised and illustrated. It begins by returning to Frampton’s key 
concepts of the filmind and filmgoer, and offers extended descriptors of these terms 
so that we might arrive at a clearer understanding of their philosophical significance. 
The filmind’s two constituting components (film-world creation/re-creation and film-
thinking) will be contextualised through Gravity and The Tree of Life with the 
intention of then identifying and discussing specific utterances within each that are 
argued to be exemplary cases of fluid film-thinking in motion. 
 
The Demonic Filmind’s Eye-view   
Filmosophy’s filmind is a transsubjective and omniscience entity of demonic 
descent whose “perspective is the whole film” and rules from an unknowable “realm 
of perspective” (Frampton, 2006:86). Such is the nature of the filmind’s potentiality 
to be all knowing, individuated, and, in principle, self-aware. Understanding the 
filmind in this manner is crucial to grasping the filmosophical concepts that stem. To 
this end, this research submits the following abstracted image of The Tree of Life in 


















Fig. 2. The filmind’s eye view of The Tree of Life (2011).  
 
The above image is the result of digital manipulation and shows the whole film 
compressed (through ‘lossy’ compression) into a single image79. It is a type of 
phrenological mapping of The Tree of Life’s filmind—a kind of ‘filmind’s eye-view’ 
of the world it itself has complete knowledge of. This unnatural perspective is, by 
itself, relatively meaningless (being seemingly abstract, emotive, even surreal), but 
grants an otherwise impossible view of Malick’s work that serves to accompany 
Frampton’s claim that the filmind “thinks with its beginning and end ‘in mind’” 
(Frampton, 2006:84). It is akin to the film’s ‘life review’ flashing before our eyes (but 
not always as The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey (2012) has shown) at 24fps and 
supplies us with a unique visualisation of the filmind’s “non-place” from which it 
intends. The image provides an anomalous articulation of filmind’s thoughtfulness, its 
hermetic totality from which no further reductions may occur—the ultimate universal 
vantage from which Laplace’s Demon resides: 
“We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect 
of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. 
Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the 
forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the 
beings who compose it — an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit 
these data to analysis — it would embrace in the same formula the 
movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the 
lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the 
past, would be present to its eyes“ (Laplace, 1951:4) 
 
Pierre-Simon Laplace, writing in A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, is 
describing a hypothetical position from which ‘the Intellect’ (quoted in the above 
translation as simply “an intelligence”) obtains its omnipotent and thus able to 
                                                




comprehend “past and future states of the system of the world” (Laplace, 1951:4). 
Laplace’s descriptions here are comparable to filmosophy’s filmind, as an appropriate 
thought experiment that can also be used to describe one of filmosophy’s key 
conceptual underpinnings. Laplace’s Intellect also serves Frampton’s claim that 
“film-thinking is not analogous with human thinking” (Frampton, 2006:92), as we are 
unable, in our limited phenomenological capacity, to fully attend to the cinematic 
event in its entirety from its entirety; or, as Laplace continues, “The human mind 
offers…a feeble idea of this intelligence” (Laplace, 1952:4). The filmind thinks the 
present with its future in mind; we (the viewer) are only privy to particular points in 
time and space, moments strung together through causal agents and informed by the 
forthcoming frames.  
 
Filmbeing Possessed: The Demonic Gatekeeper 
The Tree of Life was described by Corliss (2011) as being as “maddeningly 
Delphic as its maker”, referring to Greek mythology’s most prophetic and magisterial 
intellect, the Delphic Oracle. Filmosophy alleviates such cognitive dissonance by 
empowering the filmgoer with knowledge of the above-mentioned filmind’s ‘self-
awareness’. When the filmgoer “enters the chaos” (Frampton, 2006:178) they become 
‘demonically engaged’ as their own consciousness mixes with that of the filmind.  
This seizing is comparable to physicist James Clerk Maxwell’s ‘entropy-reducing’ 
demon, used here to describe aspects of the filmgoer’s existence with the filmind (i.e. 
their interpenetration).  
In questioning the certainty of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, Maxwell 
imagined a demon watching over a sealed container of gas molecules that could 
“produce a difference in pressure as well as temperature by merely allowing all 
particles going in one direction while stopping all those going the other way” (Knott, 
1911:215), thereby decreasing entropy within this closed system. Similarly, in 
filmosophy, the “filmgoing experience is one of constrained freedom—an endless 
push-pull mix of thinkings”. Like Maxwell’s demon, the filmosophical filmgoer is 
“always selecting and choosing” (Frampton, 2006: 162-163) as we consciously create 
order out of cinematic chaos. 
The filmgoer enters this cinematic chaos, as described by Frampton, and 




molecules) to arrive at an equally unique interpretation as a product of 
heterophenomenological sense-making. The resultant interpretation is derived from 
the filmgoer’s own cine-registry and meditations on the Laplace’s Intellect. The 
filmind (as a type of translucent, hermetic, ‘cine-capsule’) is experienced in its totality 
and remains unspoiled by invading particles (extra-textuals), but its chaotic 
composition is transfigured in filmosophy, metaphysically, into meaningful 
interpretation when the filmgoer applies their own conscious ‘energies’ and to the 
event.  
This research has thus far made the analogy that filmosophy’s filmind can, 
conceptually, and for the purposes of application, be likened to Laplace’s Demon (the 
Intellect) and the filmgoer to that of Maxwell’s Demon. It is argued that the 
comparison is particularly apt when considered both the filmind’s transsubjectivity 
(its omniscience and abyssal realm of address) and the filmosophical filmgoer’s 
pickings when confronted by such a manipulative Intellect. The result of this demonic 
marriage is filmosophy’s ‘third’ mind, and it is this union that brings with it “a new 
way of encountering film” (Frampton, 2006:162-3). 
 
The Beginning and End of the World 
Like Maxwell’s Demon and filmosophy’s ‘mixing’ of conscious intent, Plate 
(2008:1)—writing towards a critical religious theory of film in Religion and Film: 
Cinema and the Re-Creation of the World—notes that in film “worlds begin to 
collide, leaking ideas and images across the semi-permeable boundaries between 
world-on-screen and world-on-the-streets”. Plate describes this process as that of 
‘world-making’, and in filmosophy it is theoretically accounted for, firstly, through 
the filmmaking practices of film-being that presents us with “everything we see and 
hear” and, secondly, as a background concept informing the filmgoer that the filmind 
can, like Plates ‘re-creation’, be “re-thought” (Frampton, 2006:77, 79). Filmosophy 
maintains that film-world creation is the “unstudied ‘intention’ of the filmind” as the 
filmind’s basic “Ur-doxa or world belief” (Frampton, 2006:77). In this vein, the 
following offers an interpretation The Tree of Life and Gravity and their notions of 
worldmaking with the purpose of accounting for their creational conditions as the 





Source bound: Up the axis mundi 
After a biblical quote from the book of Job80, the first thought-image in The 
Tree of Life is a mysterious warm light81 that pulsates within in the black abyss of the 
screen’s frame. Zinman (2011) notes how the cryptic flame-image has confounded 
critics, but that the mysterious “yolk-coloured blob” (in the words of Variety’s Robert 
Koehler, quoted in Zinman) is part of Thomas Wilfred’s Opus 161 (1965-1966)—a 
“lumia composition” that creates art from various manipulations of light.  
Although Wilfred’s Opus 161 continues for almost two years82 it is used 
sparingly within Malick’s dreamscape to bracket specific sections of the film (as well 
as the film at large); ultimately marking both our induction and ejection from this 
“cosmically tinged” (Zinman, 2011) film-world. This lumia is not itself ‘a world’, as a 
place thought of that characters and events may inhabit; instead, it is both a pre-text 
and a recurrent philosophical point in the film’s thinkings—a “world belief” that 
primes film-thinking as a re-creational presence that the filmind establishes earlier on, 
and then returns to at various spaces in time. This is Gibbs’s “recurrent strategies”, or 
simply motif, which, while initially abstract and incoherent, gathers philosophical 
moss as the filmgoer gains insight into the demonic filminds greater knowledge of its 
world—its reasons for thinking this audacious and awe-inspiring abstraction of 
movement and light.  
Consider the second moment the lumia is ‘thought of’ as it precedes the film’s 
epic, and topical, ‘creational/cosmos sequence’. Before the film thinks Jack’s 
regression, there is an expansive and lengthy sequence of splendid impressions that, 
like the lumia that precedes it, is thinking change and becoming. The sequence has 
been ascribed various interpretations (e.g. as depicting the birth of consciousness, the 
universe’s own cosmic and eternal ebbing, as well as the evolution of life on Earth) 
but the constant between them is that of resplendent metamorphosis—a re-creational 
philosophy that is rooted in the lumia and persists in the film’s narrative ratiocinations 
on Jack’s own individuation.  
                                                
80 “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? When the morning stars sang together, and 
all the sons of God shouted for joy?” from Job 38: 4,7. 
81	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The lumia83 is The Tree of Life’s founding philosophy, its prima philosophia—
a divine and future light from which all utterances emerges and must eventually 
return. It shares the frame with no characters, and no events intrude on its memorising 
expulsion of the film’s raw and untethered thoughts on being-in-a-world.  This ‘pure’ 
thought humbles the filmgoer insofar as the filmind is constantly thinking about 
change from its very beginning through Wilson’s lumia composition. The aesthetic 
philosophy of which, like the film and Jack’s own individuated quest, explores 
themes of movement  “unfolding”, “advancing”, and “rising”—“forms of ascending 
in space and unfolding in color over a restless angular accompaniment” (Stein quoted 
in Eskilson, 2003:65). In this vein, the lumia’s usage can be understood/interpreted as 
a recurring thought (or motif) within this philosophically minding film; ‘reminders’ of 
The Tree of Life’s own recurrent spiritual musings on life and the constant re-creation 
of our individuating being. 
 
Source bound: Down to Earth  
As The Tree of Life contemplates Jack’s own spiritual progression towards 
transcendence (as the modern man in peril), so then Gravity can be said to be thinking 
the feminine counter through Dr Stone’s peregrination back to Earth—the past place 
from which her will was worn. While The Tree of Life is continually arriving and 
departing from its principle luminescence, Gravity (still narratological concerned with 
Dr Stone’s individuation) subtracts our heroine from her source (i.e. the Earth itself) 
and thinks her adrift above and beyond its life-sustaining atmospheres.  
Gravity opens its world-view by, rather literally, regarding the Milky Way’s 
only life-giving place against life-taking space—it is the distance Earth Mother to The 
Tree of Life’s sun-kissed Sky Father, and the place to which this particular Stone must 
ultimately fall. The lumia is only thought of for a few seconds, but Gravity fixedly 
thinks its opening world-view through a seventeen-minute rumination. The film’s 
undisturbed opening thought84 sees our inhabited orb slowly squeeze the character’s 
shuttle out from its vertical horizons, fluidly re-thinking this ‘out-of-this-world’ 
perspective into an actual place of being and narratological activity. Frampton writes 
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  Sheldon	   Cheney	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that the “moving frame of cinema, the thinking of movement, can be both kinetic and 
conceptual; giving life to film and tracing lines of life in film” (Frampton, 2006:131), 
such is the case here as this prolonged pondering shifts from a cosmic vista to the 
backdrop for narrative intent—a re-creational event that takes us from ‘life’ itself 
(terrestrial beings), to life removed from its source (alienated beings).  
The Opus 161 is both the alpha and omega of The Tree of Life’s film-life, and 
in Gravity Laplace’s Demon ultimately aspires to see Dr Stone answer the Earth’s 
gravitational calling—to have Stone walk upon its surface anew having ejected her 
own baggage to the orbiting space junk that devastated her mission. The film ends, 
like most of Hollywood’s mass-mindings, on a re-creational high with Stone 
struggling with her atrophic muscles as she emerges from the waters to, once again, 
stand upon the Earth’s surface; her resolve now renewed and her alienation and 
melancholia managed. Stone’s world (or, more appropriately, the world that mirrors 
Stone’s struggles and suffering) has been, macroscopically considered, re-created for 
our enjoyment and cathartic pleasure.  
 
Fluid Film-thinking 
In filmosophy fluid film-thinking alters the basic film-world from the “inside 
out”, as “re-creative” film-thinkings that “tears and rips into it, morphing it from 
within” (Frampton, 2006:88). The previous section presented film-thinking on macro 
levels (which are also often referred to singularly through narrative via ‘plot twists’, 
the ‘climax’, or their resolute ‘dénouements’—when we know a world has no long 
any capacity for significant ‘change’ we often want out, to be ejected, as it were, as 
quickly as possible), but fluid film-thinking is more interestingly discussed through 
those devilling details, subtle philosophical flecks of thought that act as enterprising 
waypoints through the transformative worldmaking at large. To this end, the follow 
interpretations draws from Frampton’s six basic modes of film composition to provide 
evidence of philosophical fluidity from selected utterances/features from Gravity and 
The Tree of Life; and in so doing demonstrating how these contemporary filminds are 








The filmind is the demonic lovechild of creative and cinematic intention. Each 
audio-visual “granule is composed to form the image that the filmind intends” 
(Frampton, 2006:117) as the filmmakers and their collective co-creators consciously 
construct as they present a particular film-world with specific emotive and dramatic 
intentions in mind. The ‘image’ is, as Frampton reminds us, “not so basic” as 
“[m]odern computer-generated imagery demands of us a greater re-thinking of the 
cinematic image” (Frampton, 2006:117). Both The Tree of Life and Gravity present 
worlds that have incorporated modern filmmaking methods—or rather, and more 
precisely, ways of thinking about cinema—that purposefully intend a world that is 
reflective of our current age of ‘plastic malleability’. 
The Tree of Life thinks in a contemporary fashion when it shows us images of 
Wilfred’s Opus 161, the Horsehead Nebula, digitally reconstructions of prehistoric 
life, cell divisions, Saturn’s rings, and so on85. These thought-images are thought of in 
a new light and subsequently serve the filminds own poetic and creative ends (and not 
their extra-textual ‘signifiers’). They go beyond referential pastiche by virtue of their 
arrangement and occupation within the filmind, their ‘basic’ meanings morphed 
through the film’s reconceptualisation of them in sight of the film’s unique 
omniscience.  
Such are the affective properties and fluid film-thoughts that filmosophy 
argues “proposes new knowledge” (Frampton, 2006:117), fresh and innovative 
manipulations of collectively sourced visions of being greater than we currently 
contemplate. The Opus 161 has become more than manipulations of light that extends 
for days on end; Barnard 33 in emission nebula IC 434 (i.e. the Horsehead Nebula) 
has been ripped from its scientific chains and been allowed to possess alternative 
interpretations and a dramatic new, even poetic, significance; dinosaurs have been 
unearth and digitally re-presented to suggest compassion, curiosity, even cruelty; 
arbitrary and abstracted micro-visions of cell-life in motion carries an expressive 
component that its biological discoverers did not document, nor likely intend; and a 
gas giant’s rocky rings now cast in shadow has perhaps returned to its romantic 
appropriation of the God of this new generation, of progressive liberation and 
dissolutions.  
                                                




These not-so-simple thought-images have been poetically re-imagined, 
removed, and re-contextualised into the mixing of consciousness filmosophy wishes 
to reveal and call attention to. A philosophy comprised of neo-thoughts and curating 
beings that morph meaningfulness by fluidly thinking new intentions, new contexts, 
and are then nominated by the demonically possessed filmgoer when they allow their 
own knowledge and the filmind’s innovative thoughtfulness to coalesce. These 
images represent new creative intentions swirled into purpose by cinema’s 
transcendental emulsification of sound-images and their creative transfiguration.  
 
Voiding Colourism 
The filmind can “feel the drama to be a certain colour” (Frampton, 2006:118); 
it can contemplate hues, saturate moments, manipulate wavelengths, and violently 
spin the colour wheel to intend specific references, emotions, and ideas. Just as 
different cultures attribute different associations and meaning to various colours in 
our spectrum, so to can different filmind re-invent these associations to tint and serve 
its own rationalities and intentions—“Filmosophy is less concerned with the meaning 
of colour than with the way in which film has colour, uses colour, and how we should 
approach that use in talk about film” (Frampton, 2006:118). How does Gravity think 
this “metaphysical dread” Hoberman (2013) describes? Remind us “human life 
cannot thrive in the vast emptiness of space” (Tan, 2013)? Or maintain a grip on 
realism while still pursuing effectual “chromatic aberration[s]” (Seymour, 2013)?  
Colour in Gravity is thought of as it exists in the presence of light—what it 
reveals to us against the abyssal canvas of the frame’s regard. Cold, lifeless chromes 
and blazing whites against space’s pure absence of light86 are the primordial tabula 
rasa Dr Stone is thought in—the womb she seeks to crawl back into as she dutifully 
quests towards her own re-birth. She has apathetically pursued the darkness of 
existence, this “metaphysical dread”, and does not wish to “thrive”; she has 
volunteered for her own abortion from the rich viability of the aqueous and earthly 
hues that have drained her life-force (Stone is single mother who lost her daughter; 
her child—along with her ‘biological responsibility’ as a mother—was cruelly seized 
by death at great existential cost). The filmind may “dramatically think events thought 
light” (Frampton, 2006:119) and in Gravity that light is dramatically sourced from the 
                                                




only life-giving star we can feel, its warmth abstracted from its photosynthesising 
processes, reduced in the void to meditations on what is (the lively Earth), what is 
barely (Stone’s current existential worth), and what is not (her active and individuated 
place in world). Gravity’s colourism is thought beyond its presentational 
differentiation to pick away at the basic film-world, morphing its ‘realistic’ intentions 
to deliberate the conflict of basking in being, and the abyssal blanket that comforts 
Stone’s existential detachment.  
 
Synthesised Sound 
The filmind “steers the sound” towards a particular thinking of its characters 
and events (Frampton, 2006:120) and, as Sobchack (2005:2) notes, new digital sound 
technologies and computer-generate imagery have given modern cinema forms of 
“ultra-hearing” and “ultra-seeing”. One of the technical criticisms against Gravity was 
that in space there is no air for sound to travel through: “[t]here’s no sound in 
space…but we use music to convey the story” (Cuarón quoted in Roper, 2013). In 
film, realism is always mattered in matters of relativity, and in Gravity sound is 
constantly being fluidly re-thought in suspenseful snippets and scores that may well 
‘defy’ the actuality of our phenomenal account of cosmic vibrations (i.e. the ‘science’ 
of sound in space); however when we understand Frampton’s conceptualising of the 
filmind, such unforgiving extra-textual comparisons fall away in the light of poetic 
expression and innovative story-telling.  
Commenting on the film’s use of sound, Steven Price (quoted in Watercutter, 
2013), Gravity’s composer, said: “Ordinarily in an action film you’re often competing 
with explosions and god knows what else, whereas with this [movie] music could do 
things a different way. With everything we did we would try and look beyond the 
normal way of doing things”. When Dr Stone is battling with the one of Soyuz 
modules’ prematurely deployed parachute (the only object to contains the aerospace 
industry’s eye-catching ‘international orange’), her efforts are compounded as the 
space debris comes around again for another test of this heroine’s resolve. Streaming 
shards of space junk bombard the ISS, adding more fragments to the perpetual torrent 
of trash circling earth. This destructive occurrence is not granted the sounds of epic 
collisions87 the viewer would perhaps expect; the impacts are soundless, their 
                                                




dynamiting devastations, instead, are metrically scored to match the images kinetic 
and intense thinkings through its unhackneyed orchestration of the destruction.  
Frampton (2006:121) writes that “[s]ilence is the darkness of sound” and 
while this moment is far from tranquil, there is a lyrical vacuum—a philosophical 
‘third noise’—within this  particular sound-image. Where are the sounds of these 
impacts? How is Dr Stone surviving this brutal bombardment with such odds? These 
are technical/narratological thinkings of old, and, instead, Gravity produces a new 
notion of survival through the sound-image that drifts counter to our auditory 
expectation of the explosions and clashes of the debris. (There is a fundamental 
difference between what we expect to hear on Earth, what we are told space sounds 
like, and what the filmind’s own presentational thoughts are on the matter). Thoughts 
of Stone’s probable death then migrate to thoughts of the improbability of (her) life in 
the cosmos, as something of value and significance struggling to continue to be so—a 
poetic third-eyed Eros (life instinct) qua brazen Thanatos (death drive).  
 
Focus: To Infinity, and Beyond! 
The filmind may choose to focus the filmgoer’s attention by rendering parts of 
the images in various degrees of sharpness. Stereoscopic cinema, as contained in 
Gravity’s 3D variant, “forces a depth of field where we may have chosen a different 
one” (Frampton, 2006:123) and the film’s unobtrusive background (i.e. the abyssal 
inkiness of space) has contributed to filmgoers hailing the experience as the “most 
significant achievement in 3D cinema” (Romney, 2013)—as one that has been able to 
“pondered the nature of stereo filmmaking rather than its effects” (Hoberman, 2013).  
In Gravity, the depth of its thinkings is ‘limited’ in so far as the infinitude of 
space imposes an inconceivable depth, but, paradoxically, that vastness collapses in 
the light of its own ‘uncluttered’ attentions88 (i.e. the characters and events 
themselves, as occurring in that screened space). ‘Space’ itself can be neither in nor 
out of focus; it contains no reference point from which to draw thoughts of depth—it 
is absolute depth. Therefore, when the filmind does draw out attention to objects (as it 
chooses what objects to grant a third-dimension to) the effect appears, not only praise-
stakingly appropriate, but that those ‘emergent’ objects are themselves aggrandised by 
the lack of intra-frame references (i.e. the filmind’s tranquil and uncomplicated 
                                                




compaction). It is arguably the closest cinema has become to producing a holographic 
narrative; Jonathan Romney (2013) alludes to this uncanny effect when he writes: 
“[I]n Gravity, you might say, the viewer is thrown at things”.   
The Tree of Life’s thinkings are less techno-centric, but a similar philosophical 
infinitude can be made comparable through the films constant ‘sun-thoughts’ (or sun 
motifs). Just as Gravity’s space-world problematises the film’s favouring of long, 
deep takes relative to limited objects, so The Tree of Life exposes the impossibility of 
thinking the sun’s ‘sharpness’—as possessing an unknowable and unobtainable detail 
or ‘essence’. Throughout The Tree of Life the film continually returns to musings over 
our galaxy’s star. Its rays permeate much of Malick’s mullings on the nature—or 
rather inherent struggles—of being in our modern world. It is a constant reminder that 
even when attention is directed with the fullest intent/willingness to know, our 
phenomenological (and cognitive) capabilities impede that desire and we displace 
ultimate knowledge for philosophical wonder.  
This constantly occurring God-image is, like the blackness of space, as ‘out-
of-focus’ as the philosophical conflicts Jack is seeking to balance. The filmind’s 
heliocentric thoughts encapsulate the film’s philosophical position that individuation 
does not arise from ‘knowing all’, but rather a softer, more humane, realisation that 
there are, indeed, forces outside of our understanding that influence us. By the end of 
the film Jack is not the all-enlightened modern man who now possesses some 
complete mystical understanding of the cosmos, but rather a contemporary soul who 
has become aware of something much greater than himself. A prima force that does 
not require total dissection in order to be spiritually absorbed, only its rays be felt and 
allowed to warm and comfort—a newly found faith in fate. 
The impossibility of putting such a distance and celestial object ‘in focus’ is a 
very obvious technical limitation, but not one that should, in turn, limit interpretations 
of the film’s philosophical mindedness. Jack is clearly in distress, his life is 
unbalanced and he is suffering because of it. He is also in constant conflict with his 
father as the powerful head of the family whose fire burns more than it warms.  In The 
Tree of Life these ‘sun-thoughts’89 are archetypal in nature, symbolic of the eternal 
‘father’, the universal motif or Imago Dei, with which Jack is in conflict with 
                                                




throughout; he does not yet truly know of this spiritual big Other, and is so blinded 
when he confronts it directly.  
When contemplating Jack’s conflict with this ‘higher power’ (and 
subsequently his own father), consider the moment when Jack is out in woods with 
his brother shooting his pellet gun90. Before Jack shoots his own brother’s finger—by 
pressuring him to place his finger over the barrel—he sees the sun being reflected in 
the river. At this moment Jack appears empowered and emboldened. This 
transcendental force that is plaguing him is no longer some distance celestial 
phenomena, but a now mere reflection in the stream that is with range of his rage—
what was infinitely above is now submissively reflected below. Jack considers, and 
then shoots the reflection; causing its glow to be dispersed and mangled within the 
watery mirror he has now so violent disturbed. It is this displaced frustration that he 
finds comfort in, the symbolic destruction of something ultimately unknowable (like 
the camera’s depth of field) and that cannot be directly addressed or confronted.  
Both Gravity and The Tree of Life contain interesting uses of focus and depth 
that address a greater philosophical concern regarding their characters’ progression 
towards individuation. In Gravity space embodies life’s ‘unknowableness’, while in 
The Tree of Life it is the persistent sun-images. Absolute light and absolute darkness 
are the existential extremes that these films philosophical orbit as their characters’ 
quests toward wholeness and salvation. 
 
Varying Speeds to Affect   
Frampton loosely defines speed as the “thoughtful intensification of time” that 
is “usually used either for phenomenological or poetic effect” (Frampton, 2006:124). 
Gravity and The Tree of Life are, generally, ‘slow-minded’ features, meditative and 
thoughtful. They take their time and hold onto thoughts as if they were our last. 
However what Frampton means when he writes about speed is, rather, the 
manipulation of it, images that have simply been either sped up or down. But 
discussions on speed need not be limited to time-lapsed manipulations along a 
continuum because—as with most of compositional interpretations—it is, as Rose 
again reminds us, the “expressive content” that completes filmic thought. In this vein 
the following discussion does not limit itself to one type of speed (i.e. that of camera, 
                                                




the characters/objects themselves, or the framed action events), and instead views 
speed as general point of philosophical inquiry.  
Gravity contains a general slowness as its characters drift perilously in space, 
and its drama is heightened/accelerated when those baseline drift speeds are disturbed 
(i.e. when the space rubble comes around and smashes into the shuttles and modules, 
or when Dr Stone becomes detached and spins out of control). Filmosophy views 
speed as the “heart of the filmind” as it allows us “into perceptions we can never 
reproduce ourselves” (Frampton, 2006:124). Gravity intensifies time in/through 
space, holding onto its utterances, through long takes, for example, while blurring and 
morphing the divisions between events through variations in speed and, naturally, 
through its characters’ weightlessness. Its stretched-out opening shot establishes and 
introduces the film’s poetic personality (as forming part of its world-view) for the 
filmgoer, refusing to suture utterances ‘technically’ (i.e. under the editor’s knife) in 
favour of organic, and sped streams of consciousness.  
Frampton writes that by recognising “slowedness” as the thoughtful 
dramatisation opens the mind to fluid interpretations (Frampton, 2006:124). Gravity’s 
opening image of the slow turning of the Earth gives way to the placid approach of 
the shuttle, to the crew serenely working around it, Dr Stone’s violent detachment, 
and then slowly drifts into Dr Stone’s helmet and starts thinking her point of view91. 
This is progressive thoughtfulness of speed illustrates the film’s ability to poetically 
morph from one ‘type’ shot to the next—a seamless event that not only washes from 
one corner of thought to the next, but one comprised of intra-thinkings of speed as 
well. (The images of Earth that open the film are gentle and undemanding compared 
to the frantic celerity of Dr Stone’s detachment as she spins uncontrollable from the 
shuttle, but are encased within a single thought or the ‘shot’) This poetic telling of 
events demonstrates how slow and accelerated moments in film can exist within a 
single, fluid, re-creational utterance that transfigures its world with varying degrees of 
poetic urgency; a speed-theme that runs throughout Gravity as sedate speeds are 
intermingled with thrilling accelerations—as the stammering ‘heartbeat’ of this 
intense cinematic fable.  
Frampton’s discussions on speed are, unfortunately, brief and would benefit 
from descriptions and examples. And while his writings on speed are largely aimed at 
                                                




slowness, he does touch on the “accelerated image” as “thinking a certain urgency or 
madness” (Frampton, 2006:124). In Gravity this exigency is most evident in the 
collisions, fluid torrents that comes around like clockwork92 and function like 
scheduled shots of adrenaline to Gravity’s core.  
In The Tree of Life’s general gentle thinkings there is one particular, albeit 
brief, moment where speed becomes particularly apparent. When Jack enters his 
office’s building, the camera rushes towards him at a rate unusual given the rest of the 
feature’s pacing93. But we cannot simply leave descriptions of this moment as ‘the 
camera rushing,’ again such technical descriptions fail to add anything meaningful, let 
alone poetic, to its inclusion and function in the film. What, exactly, is rushing 
towards Jack? Certainly not the camera (for Jack, as a character in a world, is 
‘unaware’ of how he is being thought and, obviously, of the camera itself); instead we 
must be more nuanced in our interpretations of this moment. The rest of the film does 
not exhibit such unnerving speeds, yet it appears when Jack enters his place of 
work—the site from which he is able to function, the cold workplace that demands a 
certain level of personal detachment that Jack (given his suffering) is simply unable to 
do at this point. Jack is the modern man in peril94 and this workspace is a threatening 
one, a pressure in itself that charges at him unsympathetically (without a willingness 
to know of his, and the filmind’s, more immediately regards and future contemplative 
progression). The speed is something we feel when Jack enters, an approaching rapid 
of, as Frampton suggest, maddening urgency that judges/threatens him with 
impotency in the light of his personal suffering. 
 
Framing New Knowledge Potentials   
Gravity is not a film that we are encouraged “to watch on [our] iPhone on the 
bus. You need to sit as close as you can to the biggest screen you can find—maybe a 
                                                
92 We are told in the film that the debris is said to take ninety minutes to orbit the Earth, and the film 
itself is also, suspiciously, ninety minutes long. Dr Stone experiences three bombardments during her 
mission, suggesting yet another dimension of speed as the viewer, experientially, does not feel or think 
about the film’s implied acceleration (i.e. film-time versus real-time). The film did not ‘cut-away’ to 
another story line in order to suggest this acceleration, and Gravity’s lengthy shots dissuade us from 
considering that we ‘missed’ something. Such a comparisons (between film-time and real-time) are 
extra-textual in nature despite the convenient comparison of time between the two.  
93	  See	  Appendix	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94 There is interesting comparison to be made here between Jack’s inability to function at work (as a 
modern man) and Dr Stone’s over-investment in hers (as a modern woman). While Jack cannot 
‘function’ at work due to his melancholia, Stone is portrayed as burying herself in her work (choosing 





gargantuan IMAX screen” (Edelstein, 2013); the actual frame itself can affect 
meaning before anything even comes to light. We expect less grandeur, less 
cinematic—in the purest sense—thinkings from a YouTube video than we do with 
IMAX, from a 3D feature than from the back of a car seat. And aren’t films like 
Bridget Jones's Diary (2001) not better suited to our home’s smaller, more intimate 
frames than that of Avatar (2009), Hugo (2011), or Transformers (2007)? Films such 
as Gravity, in particular, exist on the technological cuff that other variants (e.g. 
mobile viewing, home television, car seats screens, etc.), or framings, of filmgoing 
are not able to, at least not yet, fully think in terms of scale and scope. The acclaim 
Gravity has received for its 3D effects represent a massive technical achievement, but 
it also represents a new genesis of philosophical contemplation regarding cinematic 
utterances and how they are technically constituted.  
In filmosophy, the frame is a “position of knowledge” that results from “the 
knowledge the film has of its whole” and, viewed as such, “opens up the possibilities 
of meaning produced by even the slight inflections of the frame” (Frampton, 
2006:125). Gravity’s successful exhibiting of a third dimension is not, simply, a 
technical one. For when we acknowledge a new technology we are also accepting and 
exploring the existence of a new effect95. Technology itself is always value free96 and 
serves a particular creative desire or innovative effect (an seemingly obvious notion 
that often gets over-shadowed in the ‘light’ of technology itself).  
In cinema stereoscopic inclusions further subvert the phenomenological 
barrier between the filmind and our own (i.e. its immersive capacity), reinforcing the 
fantasy of our suspension of disbelief that allows for a more convincing and 
compelling fusion of minds. What 3D framing represents, philosophically, is a more 
fluid blending of consciousness, a heightened sense of believability of knowledge 
about a world. The filmind thinks specific objects in 3D (if the whole feature were in 
                                                
95 The trend of re-releasing films in 3D, for example, is also not simply to ‘relive’ the experience but, 
as Chang (2012:4) notes in his write-up of Titanic 3D (2012), it “brings out a [new] startling visual and 
emotional dimension” and is not simply cinema’s "way of surviving as a medium of attraction" (Eivind 
Røssaak quoted in Belisle, 2013:130). The experience is heightened and this does has obvious box 
office draw, but further immersion should not been seen as pure gimmickry and technology for 
technology’s sake. As stereoscopic cinema becomes viewed as more ‘acceptable’ (e.g. as was the case 
with synchronised sound)—perhaps more ‘invisible’ to us—so in turn will its awe-invoking effects 
become paired discussions on its philosophical and storytelling potentialities. 
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‘3D’ we then enter the realm of the holographic image rather than the cinematic in the 
classic sense) and therefore renders them phenomenological as specific affecting 
utterances that transfigure the filminds reality. 
Therefore the screen itself is a type of thinking—the frame is “steering our 
thinking before we realise it” (Frampton, 2006:125). In 2013 South Korean director 
Kim Ji-woon’s short film The X (2013) was premiered at the Busan International Film 
Festival; a revolutionary cinematic event that utilised a unique screen (i.e. a new 
“position of thinking”) that stretched 270-degrees around the filmgoer (called 
‘ScreenX’ technology). Filmgoers who attended the premiere simply must not have 
know what to think; but were still somehow anticipating the film’s bizarre new 
thoughtfulness before the action-packed filmind was even show itself—they were 
thinking technological revolution before its life-giving torch was even lit. Such is the 
case with Gravity and its remarkable use of the third dimension as objects and space 
junk make phenomenological and poetic demands of our consciousness, and in doing 
so inviting us to think differently with its new cinematic imaginings. 
Another way framing is addressed in filmosophy is through its ability to 
“think any vantage point in a single room” (Frampton, 2006:126), as some 
cinematically enabled ‘fly-on-the-wall’. Filmosophy lauds the film’s capacity to 
occupy that fly’s fragment visions, to think slowly a bullet in flight, be able witness 
the re-creation of cosmic structures, to muse over prehistoric life, or occupy Dr 
Stone’s visor and share her ‘point of view’. There are a number of moments in both 
Gravity and The Tree of Life that challenges the formal understanding held by 
technicists of the ‘point of view’ shot. When Dr Stone, for example, finally emerges 
from the wreckage of her capsule, now exhausted, she lets her body float atop the 
water as she watches the rest of the module burn across the sky97. Her body drifts so 
that we regard the back of her head, and then the camera assumes to think her view of 
capsules disintegration above. The burning fragments are then ‘seen’ along with flies 
buzzing around and, most telling, now the water-born grass has entered ‘our’ vision. 
Before, when Stone first emerged, there was no such grass, but after the film 
‘withdraws’ from its ‘sky-thinkings’ (Dr Stone’s view while she is floating) she is 
then shown in close proximity to this waterborne flora. The camera has managed to 
‘possess’ her character’s view (i.e. dynamically shifting from ‘objectively’ regarding 
                                                




Stone in the water to the ‘subjectivity’ of a P.O.V—a fluid transition between 
objective and subjective thinkings) and, in doing so, has traversed and assimilated 
subject-object relations into its own thinkings and back fluidly without interference 
(such as a cut). Like the film’s opening shot (whereby the filmind morphed into Dr 
Stone’s suit to suggest her disorientating point of view as she tumbled through space), 
here the frame is being used in such a way that must be considered philosophically 
significant, as problematizing the mind-body conflict through cinema’s unique 
capacities for neo-thoughts.  
Such transfiguring is a feature of Gravity’s subtly collapsing of the filmgoers 
assumptions of subjectivity and objectivity; producing a third thought that cannot be 
described or differentiate from the film’s wholesome regard, but is also no less 
philosophically significant as it illustrates a double-aspect solution to the mind-body 
problem. As mentioned, in filmosophy framing is a ‘position of knowledge’ and so 
when we can safely say that technology (such is the case with Gravity) has influenced 
the frame in some way, we must then explore the effective knowledge it brings about, 
and not simply seek to only deconstruct its technical workings, or else risk subverting 
the cinematic effect in favour of extra-textual technological fantasies. In short, we 
must ask more seriously what is so special about this new effect, and not substitute 
the cinematic experience for extra-textual wonderment.  
 
Movement and Re-birth  
Filmosophy tells that: “The moving frame of cinema, the thinking of 
movement, can be both kinetic and conceptual; giving life to film and tracing lines of 
life in film” (Frampton, 2006:131). The revolutionary and innovative effect of 
Gravity’s Iris is evidence of the medium’s new technology thrust, as the thoughtful 
reconceptualising of the camera’s movements that requires a new language outside 
the “technicist rhetoric” (Frampton, 2006:130). Other than Iris’s “kinetic” innovations 
(e.g. thinking its characters as weightless), there is one particularly enchanting 
movement in Gravity that illustrates the filmind’s potential for “conceptual” 
movements.  
After Kowalski detaches himself from Dr Stone the mission specialist enters 
the ISS, removes her spacesuit and, in one of films rare ‘static’ camera moments, she 




Having let go mentally and physically, her body slowly contracts within the circular 
confines of the space capsule, allowing her body to will its own form98. What comes 
next is perhaps the films most engaging moment of the entire film: Dr Stone’s body 
steadily contracts to the safety of the fetal position. This movement is a microcosm 
for Stone’s desire to escape and regress towards a simpler state of being, a return to an 
earlier stage in her development, as she becomes, at this mid-point, “a child waiting to 
be born or die” (Corliss, 2013).  
There is no gravity to impede this movement, no Earthly complications to 
hinder her mind-body’s desire to pull into itself—it is a solitary centripetal 
contemplation within the vacuum of alienating space; one that many critics and 
viewers have exclaimed as one of film’s most compelling utterances. Her ‘fetal drift’ 
is a conceptualisation of her existential anxiety; a lucid thought that also disentangles 
itself from the camerabatics the filmgoer has engaged with up to now—this is fluid 
film-thinking’s re-creational power and promise at play. 
 
Dream-Shifts Big and Small 
In 1930 the American poet H.D. wrote: “The film is the art of dream 
portrayal” (quoted in Lebeau, 2001:3). Cinema’s plethora of phantasmagoria and 
dream-inducing perceptions and have long placed the film spectator at the imagined 
vanishing point of filmic address, one that straddles the conscious divide between 
illusion and reality, of waking life and the dream images that shadow it. The French 
poet and playwright Antonin Artaud went as far with the film-dream analogy to state 
that: “If the cinema is not made to translate dreams or all that which, in conscious life, 
resembles dreams, then cinema does not exist” (quoted in Lebeau, 2001:32).  
Christian Metz strongly questioned the romantic ‘film-as-dream’ analogy in 
his seminal text The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema (1977). 
Nadaner (1984:125) summarises Metz’s three main reasons why such a comparison is 
problematic as follows: “the perception of film is real perception, not an internal 
psychic event; films are more structured than dreams; and they are not as absurd”. 
Metz’s criticisms did, however, leave the essential key tenets of the analogy intact, 
ultimately suggesting that the film-viewing process is perhaps more akin to that of a 
daydream:  
                                                




The research on cognitive states, whether that state is hypnosis, dream, 
daydream, or virtual life experience, brings with it a conviction that an 
intense kind of cognitive experience is undergone during film viewing. 
(Nadaner, 1984:125).  
 
This has deeply fascinated film theorists, and there have been various approaches to 
exploring the mental processes in operation both while dreaming and while watching 
a film. Lebeau (2001:3) notes that cinema “has a special tie to the life of the mind: 
approximate, imitative, it is a type of mime of both mind and world”. Filmosophy 
does not emphatically concur en masse psychoanalytical film theory’s romanticised 
film-as-dream analogy, but it does value the insight and the possible interpretations 
that psychoanalysis can supply the interpreter. Frampton comments on such 
interpretations as follows: 
The film writer can use filmosophical concepts of meaning creation 
and add a psychoanalytical reading, or related the film to its context or 
environment, or propose how the film creates a space for ideological 
critique. (Frampton, 2006:181) 
 
In this vein, Gravity and The Tree of Life both contain utterances and sequences that 
are explicitly comparable to that of dreams, and filmosophy encourages that such 
fluid film-thinkings be addressed accordingly as ‘psychoanalytically minded’ 
moments and sequences.  
After Dr Stone enters the ISS via an airlock, she evades a firestorm and moves 
into the Russian Soyuz module only to discover that the pod has no fuel. Dr Stone 
resigns herself to death by switching off the oxygen supply and hopes for a peaceful 
end while she listens to a Greenlandic Inuit fisherman over the intercom99. However 
before her suicide is complete, veteran astronaut Matt Kowalski suddenly appears at 
the airlock’s window (even though Kowalski sacrificed himself earlier) and proceeds 
to join her in the Soyuz by compromising the airlock100 (which ‘should have’ killed 
                                                
99	  Interestingly,	  Jonás	  Cuarón	  (who	  co-­‐wrote	  the	  script	  for	  Gravity)	  also	  released	  the	  seven-­‐
minute	  short	  film	  Aningaaq	  (2013)	  that	  shows	  the	  Inuit	  fisherman’s	  ‘side’	  of	  this	  radio	  encounter.	  
It	  is	  tempting	  to,	  as	  Christopher	  Rosen	  (2013)	  did	  writing	  for	  the	  Huffington	  Post,	  view	  this	  short	  
feature	  as	  ‘revealing’	  the	  “Other	  Half	  Of	  Key	  Scene”,	  but	  the	  film	  is	  only	  a	  spin-­‐off	  and	  is	  not	  
required	  to	  understand	  the	  events	  of	  the	  film	  (like	  it	  would	  with,	  for	  example,	  transmedia	  
storytelling).	  The	  cinematic	  experience	  of	  Gravity	  does	  not	  concern	  itself	  with	  Aningaaq,	  and	  the	  
short	  feature	  is	  its	  own	  event.	  A	  whole	  other	  film	  could	  be	  made	  regarding	  the	  politics	  and	  panic	  
experience	  by	  mission	  command	  as	  they	  search	  for	  their	  lost	  astronauts,	  of	  the	  Russians	  trying	  to	  
cover	  up	  their	  missile	  strike,	  or	  any	  other	  imaginable	  event	  in	  Gravity’s	  world.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  
the	  film	  itself	  is	  complete,	  and	  has	  no	  ‘gaps’	  in	  its	  tale	  to	  fill.	  Aningaaq	  does	  not	  add	  to	  the	  
cinematic	  experience	  of	  Gravity,	  only	  the	  social	  experience.	  	  




Stone). With the same charm and charisma as before, Kowalski reminds Stone that 
the Soyuz’s landing rockets will be able to get her to the Chinese Space Station 
Tiangong. Stone then ‘awakens’ from her near-death experience/lucid dream, turns 
the oxygen back on, and successfully navigates herself, alone, to salvation. 
This is a prime example of how a film might fluidly think in/through dream. 
The filmgoer is ‘aware’ that Kowalski is actually dead, as film-world’s own 
narratological logic dictates. However despite all these seemingly illogical 
happenings, the film is still able to think his return (as the filmind is indeed capable of 
via the demonic deus ex machina), an event made possible as the film fluidly re-
thinks its film-world (not narrative) and shifts from Stone’s current predicament to the 
hallucinatory visions of her deceased mentor and back again.  
Frampton (2006:131) notes that such “shifts” are a kind a movement, “a 
decision to go somewhere else, to show a different view of an event in progress” that 
can “mark a move into memory, fantasy, dream or hallucination”. This particular shift 
is considered fluid as the filmind is thinking the re-creation of its film-world via 
recognisable dream-logic (it is thinking hallucination), a dynamic conveyance that is 
not contemplated by “the blurred, warped or watery image that usually signals the 
transition” (Frampton, 2006:131), but seamlessly integrated into the film. 
Dr Stone is not herself ‘dreaming’ of Kowalski’s return (and so directly 
receiving his life-saving knowledge), but instead the film is thinking salvation 
through a type of dreamwork. During this oneiric utterance, the Kowalski figure 
reminds Stone that the information he passes to her she already knows from training 
(as existing within her own memory). Thus, the knowledge is not ‘new’ in the sense 
that it does not originate from his own, narratological, being, but rather he is a 
transfigured messenger that resembles Kowalski—the trustworthy figure/vessel 
conveying information that was previously latent or, perhaps, ‘subconscious’.  
Shelborne (1983:64) writes that dreamwork is “one method by which the 
unconscious could be explored” and by examining dreams “the person pursuing 
individuation comes to learn of different aspects of himself of which he was formerly 
unaware” (Shelburne, 1983:64). In the case of Dr Stone and her quest towards 
individuation, this moment reveals a prior knowledge (received from her training) in 
the form of Kowalski’s ‘supernatural’ return, uttered as part of the filmind’s fluid 




Similarly, but on a larger film-time scale, The Tree of Life contains a number 
of oneiric musings that, when acknowledge as such, illuminates some of film’s 
confusing sound-images. In The Tree of Life the filmind’s thoughts of Jack’s 
childhood are, narratively considered, a type of daydream. Jack himself remains at 
work, but is deeply troubled by the psychological weight his brother’s death bears. 
Jack is not asleep (in fact he is first shown waking up in his house with his wife, and 
this is not a type of Jungian ‘false-awakening’) but the film’s own space-time 
inferences informs that the sound-images of his childhood are rather memories being 
dreamily recalled (like Gravity’s hallucinatory thinkings of Kowalski); a self-induced 
psychotherapy, or ‘thinking cure’, to his modern neurosis. While Gravity fluidly 
thinks it shifts into hallucination within a single thought-image (i.e. an uninterrupted 
take), Jack’s regression is produced progressively through a series of shifts. 
Frampton writes that shifts “expand and collapse a sense of space for the 
filmgoer” (2006:135) and it is through such undulations that The Tree of Life 
transitions into meditations on Jack’s past. The filmind thinks Jack in the room with 
his parents in the aftermath of the family’s loss, and also via a P.O.V, towards shifting 
its thinkings into Jack’s past. Unlike Gravity, The Tree of Life holds its oneiric 
meditations for the majority of the film and mulls over moments in Jack’s childhood 
that are cued as pivotal points of psychological conflict (as obstacles to 
individuation). These image-thoughts are not ‘exact’ memories revealing themselves 
to Jack qua Jack’s conscious recollection, but lucid manifestations of the filmind’s 
thoughts on the psychoanalytical significance of his trauma and, subsequently, his 
own individuation.  
To further illustrate how The Tree of Life’s filmind can be said to be thinking 
psychoanalytically, this research submits two scenes that explicitly thinks the classic 
Oedipus conflict—the “incestuous and parricidal dream” that embodies the “drama of 
sex and murder in the family supposed to preoccupy us all” (Lebeau, 2001:6). In these 
moments101 the film erotically regards Jack’s relationship with his mother, and 
ponders his ‘childlike’ desire to eliminate his father. In the first series of thoughts the 
filmind objectifies Jack’s mother by sexualising her, otherwise mundane, actions (e.g. 
fetishising of the feet, phallic suggestions via the hose as Jack drinks deep from it, 
                                                




voyeuristically regarding Mrs O’ Brien as she hangs her wash load, and as Jack gazes 
up at her in the window).  
Comparably, Jack’s conflict with his father takes on Freudian taint when Mr. 
O’ Brien is working on the undercarriage of the family car. Mr. O’ Brien position, 
like his wife’s activities, do not inherently invite parricidal thoughts, but the filmind 
thinks him vulnerable through the filmind’s ”position of thinking” (Frampton, 
2006:125), or ‘framing’ as the manner in which the filmind intends the event. The 
carjack (the only object preventing the car from succumbing to gravity) is part of this 
thought, and, like Jack’s sexualised gaze towards his mother, the converse of the 
complex is found here as the filmind muses over the ease at which the carjack might 
be disturbed (which would likely kill Mr. O’ Brien); suggested by Jack himself as he 
regards both the carjack (as the means to his father’s end) and their environment (to 
avoid witnesses that might shame him). 
If we consider psychoanalytical film theory’s film-as-dream analogy as 
absolute, such moments would then be considered a type of mise-en-abyme (i.e. 
dream-within-a-dream, or double-dream), a self-reflexive utterance that has the 
filmgoer tumbling down a, theoretically never-ending, ‘wonderlandic’ void. Although 
such a comparison can be made (e.g. Inception, The Matrix, Alice in Wonderland, 
etc.) this is the point where filmosophy and psychoanalysis differ. The filmind is 
capable of dream-like thoughts, but is not itself a type of ‘meta-dream’ (as such a 
comparison reductio ad absurdum concludes). Instead, it is simply a narratological 






















“The spiritual adventure of our time is the exposure of human consciousness to the 
undefined and indefinable” 
- C. G. Jung (quoted in Jaffé 1984:61) 
 
 
This research has been towards the advancement of filmosophy as a rich and fertile 
new mode of cinematic inquiry. Seeking philosophical significance in film is not, 
however, a new endeavour, and the array of writings on the subject is vast and 
increasing; but most research has become overly invested in documenting the 
philosophy in/through film (e.g. a Nietzschean ‘reading’ of Béla Tarr, or studying 
Heidegger through/in the films of Terrence Malick)—in general attempting to 
redefine auteur theories into historical accounts of philosophical thought. These are 
linguistic and literary approaches that aim to prescribe philosophical significance 
through inadequate abstractions of cinematic experiences into another language, and 
in doing so we risk truncating the potential growth of the medium-specific 
contributions to philosophy. If we truly are living in/progressing deeper into an ocular 
centric age, then we must re-evaluate our tendency to simplify the philosophical 
output our era is producing via its images. 
Livingston’s ‘problem of paraphrase’ is the direct result of our tendency to 
transpose/interpret notably philosophical cinematic utterances into the written word, 
literary texts that appear more manageable and appropriate when discerning and 
judging philosophical significance and a work’s value. Problematising the ‘film-as-
philosophy’ debate in this way has proven inadequate and clumsy, and involves a 
culling of cinema’s uniqueness and philosophical potential. Both Livingston and 
Smuts understand the problem (i.e. the ‘bold thesis’ film theorists appease), and both 




epistemic constraints. Indeed, to ‘paraphrase’ a film’s philosophical statements does 
involve compromise, but if we are to truly embrace film’s philosophical potential and 
indeed future (as well as honestly judge and value their artistic and social 
significance) we need to release ourselves from the rigidity of this self-imposed, 
historically informed, restriction.  
Livingston feels this issue when he says the “burden” of the “philosophically-
oriented interpreter” to develop and employ a well-defined “problematique” 
(2006:13); what Smuts suggest when he promotes cinema’s ‘paradigmatic’ means 
(2009:410); it is what Rose moves towards in promoting a type of “visual 
connoisseurship” (2012:52) as we start to “take images seriously” (2012:17); Virginia 
Woolf (quoted in Frampton, 2006:26) words when she asks: “Is there any 
characteristic which thought possesses that can ben rendered visible without the help 
of words?”; Holly yearns for the awe and ‘wonder’ that is “in excess of research” 
(Holly quoted in Cheetham, et al., 2005:88); it is what Stanley Kubrick notes as film 
“avoids intellectual verbalisation” (quoted in Frampton, 2006:26); a ‘gap’ that Žižek 
describes through his parallaxes; and a frustration that Frampton’s seeks to address 
with his philosophy of filmind—the new study of “film as thinking” (2006:6). Indeed 
“[w]e must be better connoisseurs of film is we are not to be as much at the mercy of 
perhaps the greatest intellectual and spiritual influence of our age as to some blind 
and irresistible elemental force” (Béla Balázs, 1945:17).  
Frampton’s filmosophy cannot simply be dismissed as a new-age neologism; 
it is a progressive—yes radical—and much-needed portmanteau that synthesises the 
troubling hyphenation that film and philosophy continues to try bridge both 
linguistically and theoretically; it is a fruitful cine-sniglet102 that describes the terrain 
from which and to which the future of the medium and our thinkings are emerging. 
Frampton’s filmosophy is a new concept in film theory (and inherently 
consilient in nature) and there are few writings that directly incorporate its 
propositions. To that end this research has explored filmosophy’s key concepts and 
terms and sort to: present filmosophy as naturally arising from our current 
understanding on film and philosophy; discuss and diffuse the teething criticism 
against as a new approach to thinking about the relationship between film philosophy; 
explore a suitable theorectical framework (ontological, epistemological, and 
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methodological) to ‘ground’ its radicalness within appropriate contemporary theories 
and approaches; expand descriptions of filmosophy’s key terms (i.e. filmind and 
filmgoer as ‘demonic’ beings, and ‘film-world re-creation”); and present and discuss 
suitable examples of its ‘fluid film-thinkings’ through two contemporary, forward-
thinking, and fascinating features. This research has also aimed to provide 
interpretations that are aligned with Frampton’s notes on filmosophical writing and 
interpretation by avoiding technicist terms, incorporating suitable metaphors and 
analogies, and by addressing the film drama itself rather than indulging in ‘extra-
textual’ comforts.  
 
Squaring the Circle 
Cinema is the fluid future of our thought, and filmosophy’s fluid film-thinking is 
the exciting elixir—the filmosopher’s cine-stone or aurea apprehension (‘golden 
understanding’)—that begins, like the proverbial ‘fade to/from black’ and the 
alchemists opening ‘negredo’, with a visible blackening that thickens and enriches our 
mind’s eye. Cinema’s abyssal blisses, those aqueous re-creations, are constantly 
appearing and disappearing in the stream of consciousness that constitutes 
filmosophy’s mixing of minds; illusive truths that flicker forth into being then fade to 
a pure and enlightened darkness form which they came; they are prophetic swirls that 
point at a philosophical future that is becoming of the medium. The screen itself is the 
neo-alchemist’s ‘black sun’, the sol niger that “holds a transformative possibility and 
an experience that opens the dark eye of the soul” (Marlan, 2005:23)—the mystical 
and philosophical quest to “penetrate the mystery of life” (Read, 1933:251)—and is 
the contemporary caldron from/in to which future demons toil to dead reckon this 
coming change:  
The highest experience of mind, such as poetry and metaphysics 
[where] only a psychology of expanded states of mind will bring out all 
the possibilities of a cinema whose functions is the visual 
representation changing forms of the mind. (Gilbert-Lecomte quoted in 
Frampton, 2006:24-25) 
 
Change, as a philosophy, is the only consilient constant we need now explore and, 
like the alchemists of old, we must become aware that the “quest is more important 




cinema lies not in theorectical exposition or in our technological tenaciousness, but, 
rather, in the poetic and fluid excesses of progressive cinematic engagements.  
Filmosophy encapsulates this process of individuation—of cinema’s fluid 
becoming and this constant evolution of thought—and describes a tantalising ladder 
from which theorist and filmgoers may aim towards the fluid future of cinema and, 
indeed, mankind’s philosophical due course. To speak of the filmind is to imagine a 
future of film that knows no limits, because there are none. Its future is a brewing 
torrent, innovative visions to which this research has hope to explore and make 
known by discussing and expanding Frampton’s own ‘radical’ ruminations. By 
unpacking specific utterances found within The Tree of Life and Gravity, this paper 
submits that they are future signs of a coming significance that, while we have the 
language to describe their technical existence, require a more prudent experiential 
understanding of their philosophical potency and capacity for enlightenment. Biro 
(quoted in Frampton, 2006:26) writes that “[i]If the camera is an extension of our 
eyes, the broadening of our vision, then it is also an extension of our intellect”, an 
augmentation of current minds that demands meditation in order to see what is 
already before us—the liquid future that is lapping at our present heels.  
Filmosophical language, interpretation, and meditation are inclusive 
endeavours that wish to break the illusion of chains of cinematic realities, not to 
escape the ‘cine-cave’, but to empower and encourage free-thinking when we willing 
open our minds to the wonderful future of film and our own collective consciousness. 
This is how philosophy gets through film, how it can be said to be philosophising and 
birth new knowledge. 
By presenting and exploring the progressive fluid-thoughts in the two films 
submitted, this research arrives at the over-arching philosophy of constant becoming, 
of re-creationism and our never-ending thrust towards individuation. Gravity and The 
Tree of Life believe in the philosophy of change, not simply in narrative terms as Jack 
and Dr Stone as modern man and woman personally progressing, but as a deep-seated 
contention that progression is the fundamental human condition, as the ‘strange 
attractor’ that drives our advancement through these chaotic and unstable worlds. And 
cinema is that philosophy of constant becoming: “Film-thinking transforms the 
recognisable (in a small or large way), and this immediate transfiguration by film 




The philosophy behind this mythical transformation is not new, the alchemists 
sought to “transform the world to change life, and hence liberate man to transform the 
world” (Schwarz, 1980:58) and it is the individuation process that they called the 
‘golden awareness’. Alchemy, like filmosophy, aims to “open the way toward total 
liberation” (Schwarz, 1980:58), to open the ‘window into eternity’ (Dourley, 
2011:515). Frampton’s research itself was inspired by such thinkings, citing Roger 
Gilbert-Lecomte’s 1933 essay “The Alchemy of the Eye” in his pretext to his thesis 
thoughts:  
This is the only, but immense raison d'être of the cinema: it is the 
mediator between the mind and nature, and can express in movement 
and visible forms the development of the forms of mind. If man decides 
that this is the role of film, it could become the means of expression 
whose ‘invention’ would be almost as important as that of language and 
writing; indeed it would become a plastic language. Thus film, a tool of 
research and experience, would become a mode of knowledge, a form 
of the mind. (Gilbert-Lecomte quoted in Frampton, 2006:24) 
 
Thoughts to which Frampton returns to in his conclusion: 
Filmosophy is a product of our current age of plastic malleable 
cinema. It is also a product of our current age of knowledge about 
cinema conventions: an unlearning, a more ‘suitable’, more cinematic 
reconceptualisation. (Frampton, 2006:212) 
 
Gilbert-Lecomte’s ‘plastic language’ and Frampton’s ‘plastic cinema’ are descriptions 
of change worded to describe cinema’s essential dynamism. The alchemic analogy is 
attached here to filmosophy in so far as the philosophical natures of their endeavours 
are akin. Alchemists, like film-beings and goers, project themselves onto matter to 
“bring about unity from the disparate parts of the psyche, creating a ‘chemical 
wedding’ [a mixing]… and attempts to bring about the mysterious ‘unification’ he 
calls Wholeness” (Marlan, 2005:10). Filmosophy’s ‘mixing’ of minds is therefore 
alchemic in nature, and alchemy, like filmosophy, is: 
[A]n earnest search after truth, in the light of that principle of the unity 
of matter which has been rediscovered by modern science. Is it too 
much to hope that time by degrees will bring forth a corresponding 
unity of heart which will act as an elixir of life in the regeneration of 
the nations? (Read, 1933:278). 
 
Read’s writings echo Wilson’s call to consilience, his ‘unity of knowledge’, that 
film, with its futurist thinkings, is able to embody the hope that such calls can be 




political dissatisfactions documented, love confessed, fears imagined, and inspirations 
immortalised for future generations to heed and possibly enact. Philosophically, 
cinema has always been ‘ahead of its time’, the screen is our Ouija board, its neo-
thinkings birthed from the philosophical planchette we energise when we make and 
merge with these nigh realities as we progress towards a belief of a future world: 
The filmosopher is the person of tomorrow and the days after 
tomorrow. The filmosopher engages in a thinking of and for the future 
(where film ‘tells’ us new things). In filmosophy film is the beginning 
and the future of our thought. We thought we needed to calculate our 
beliefs about the world, but the of philosophy, with its metaphorical 
pictures of that belief, might lead us to realise that we can understand 
the world in like manner – that we can ‘film’ our beliefs. (Frampton, 
2006: 212-213) 
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4. Jack shooting his brother (left) and the sun’s reflection (right): 
 














6. Oedipal conflict in The Tree of Life—phallic suggestions towards his mother (left) 
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6. Kowalski’s dreamy return: 
 
 
